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UNENUMERATED RIGHTS IN DIFFERENT
DEMOCRATIC REGIMES
Stephen M. Feldman'
Are Lochner v. New York' and Roe v. Wade2 the same or different?
The Supreme Court based both decisions on unenumerated constitu-
tional rights: Lochner on liberty to contract, and Roe on the right of
privacy. While neither of these rights is expressly delineated in the
constitutional text, both the Lochner and Roe Courts tied the respec-
tive rights to due process.3 Thus, these two landmark cases have been
constantly linked for more than a quarter century. The Roe CourtJus-
tices themselves worried about analogies to Lochner. And since Roe
was decided in 1973, critics and defenders have been dancing a well-
practiced minuet: critics charging that Roe is Lochner all over again,
defenders distinguishing the two cases, castigating Lochner while cele-
brating Roe.
Most of the defenders and critics in this dance focus on the mean-
ing of substantive due process. Some critics of both Lochner and Roe
insist that substantive due process is an oxymoron. After all, the Fifth
and First Amendments guarantee due "process," not due substance.
Should not the right to due process guarantee that the government
follow certain procedures in appropriate circumstances, and nothing
else, nothing substantive? Other critics, particularly of Roe, construct
a syllogistic argument supposedly based on history. During the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, it is argued, the Court de-
cided a series of cases, including Lochner, that interpreted due process
as encompassing the substantive right of liberty to contract. In the
1930s, when the New Dealers started passing economic and social
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198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See id. at 164 ("A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type, that excepts
from criminality only a life-saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to preg-
nancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 ("The general right to
make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by
the [Due Process Clause of the] Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.").
See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 117 (citing the Lochnerdissent).
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welfare legislation to shake the nation from its Great Depression dol-
drums, the Court stubbornly continued to invalidate laws that vio-
lated due process (or were otherwise beyond congressional power).
President Franklin Roosevelt responded with his Court-packing plan,
generating a constitutional crisis. Finally, in 1937, the Court capitu-
lated with its "switch in time that saved nine," repudiating Lochner and
the substantive due process protection of liberty to contract. 5 Yet in
Griswold v. Connecticut,5 decided in 1965, and then in Roe, the Court
resuscitated substantive due process and held that it protected a right
of privacy, encompassing a woman's interest in choosing whether to
have an abortion. Thus the syllogism: Lochner-era liberty to contract
cases were grounded on substantive due process; substantive due
process was misguided; therefore, Lochner-era liberty to contract cases
were wrongly decided; finally, Roe-era right to privacy cases, also
grounded on substantive due process, must also be wrongly decided.
In short, if liberty to contract is not constitutionally protected, then
the right of privacy likewise should not be protected.
7
Defenders of Roe, at this point, typically pirouette and argue that
not all substantive due process cases are alike. They underscore that,
in the 1920s, the Court relied on its substantive due process prece-
dents to invalidate state laws restricting the autonomy or privacy of
parents deciding how to raise their children.8 In 1937, the defenders
Thomas Reed Powell first called the Court's change the "switch in time that saved nine."
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arguments concerning substantive due process, see James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered:
Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 315-19
(1999). To gain an understanding of the Court's jurisprudence of the 1930s, see generally
BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE
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7 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OFAMERICA 116 (1991) (arguing that Roeshould
be "relegated to the dustbin of history where Dred Scott and Lochner lie"); John Hart Ely, The
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therefore argue, the Court repudiated not all substantive due process
decisions but only those protecting economic rights, particularly lib-
erty to contract. The incipient right of privacy cases remained good
law. Roe-era right of privacy cases do not manifest an atavistic and
corrupt appearance of a repudiated constitutional doctrine but
rather rely on ajudicial awareness that not all substantive due process
cases are equivalent. The Court has correctly developed a nuanced
understanding of liberty under due process. Quite simply, then, the
right of privacy is properly protected, while liberty to contract is
properly unprotected. Lochner and Roe are distinguishable."
In this article, I argue that this entire dance is out of step with the
historical music. The analogical link between Lochner and Roe is ahis-
torical and misleading. The key to understanding the relationship
(or lack of relationship) between Lochner and Roe is not the definition
of substantive due process. In fact, no Supreme Court Justice even used
the phrase "substantive due process" until 1948, when Justice Wiley B.
Rutledge used it in dissent.' ° To understand Lochner and Roe cor-
rectly, one must understand that each was decided under a different
democratic regime: Lochner under republican democracy, Roe under
pluralist democracy. Because of the distinctive characteristics of re-
publican and pluralist democracies, the practices of judicial review
starkly differed under each. Put in different words, Lochner and Roe
were decided within distinct paradigms of democracy and constitu-
tional law, and as such the cases are largely incommensurable."1
Part I of this article describes republican democracy, republican
democratic judicial review, and the Lochner decision. Part II focuses
on the development of pluralist democracy and the problem of re-
casting judicial review under this new democratic regime. Part III fo-
cuses on Roe as a definitive unenumerated rights case decided under
pluralist democracy. Part IV, the Conclusion, explains why Lochner
9 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 874-75 (1987) (distin-
guishing right of privacy cases from Lochner-era liberty to contract cases).
10 Ely, supra note 5, at 319 (citing Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 90
(1948) (RutledgeJ., dissenting)).
It My thesis builds on Howard Gillman's reinterpration of the Lochner era. Gillman argues
that the Supreme CourtJustices of the Lochner era did not radically depart from previous consti-
tutional decision-making to decide in accordance with their conservative political views. Rather,
the Justices continued to interpret the Constitution to proscribe class legislation, a proscription
with roots in the nineteenth century (and even earlier). GILLMAN, supra note 5, at 61-62.
David E. Bernstein criticizes Gillman for misconstruing many Lochner-era cases. Bernstein, supra
note 5, at 13-31. I find Gillman more persuasive than Bernstein, who seems to misunderstand
the proscription of class legislation. In particular, Bernstein does not give enough weight to the
fact that legislatures could infringe on individual liberties to promote the common good. See
WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA passim (1996) (discussing at length nineteenth-century cases contrasting the common
good and partial or private interests); WHITE, supra note 5, at 246-51 (following Gillman's ap-
proach).
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and Roe should be analogized only with extreme caution-if at all-
and why such caution has rarely been exercised.
I. REPUBLICAN DEMOCRACYANDJUDICIAL REVIEW
Republican democracy was grounded on three fundamental com-
ponents. First, the people were sovereign; government supposedly
rested on the consent of the governed. Second, the people as well as
their elected officials were supposed to be imbued with civic virtue.
Third, because they were virtuous, the people and the governmental
officials were supposed to pursue the common good rather than "pri-
vate and partial interests." The government, in theory, was to re-
spect individual liberties but could always restrict them in pursuit of
the common good.
During the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, innumerable
legal disputes turned on the distinction between the common good
and partial or private interests or, as it was sometimes phrased, the
difference between reasonable and arbitrary (or class) legislation.
Some judges, seeking precision, would equate reasonableness with a
means-ends nexus: the governmental action must be a reasonable
means for achieving the government's purpose, which must consti-
tute the common good. 13 For most judges, it should be added, the
crucial distinction between the categories of the common good, on
the one hand, and partial or private interests, on the other, was for-
malistic. That is to say, the line between the opposed categories
might initially be obscure in any concrete dispute, but the demarca-
tion was real and could be discerned through careful analysis. The
key, then, to the judicial analysis was the categorization of the gov-
ernmental purpose: was it for the common good or not? This analy-
sis did not involve a weighing or balancing of the government's pur-
pose or interest against countervailing interests; the judicial
12 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 59 (1969).
The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution, for example, made this an explicit provision: "Govern-
ment is instituted for the common good, for the protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness of
the people, and not for the profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family, or class of
men...." MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. VII, reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 956,
958 (Ben Perley Poore ed., 2d ed. 1878).
13 Justice Brown, for instance, wrote:
To justify the state in ... interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,
first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The
legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily inter-
fere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful
occupations.
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
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conclusion supposedly rested on the proper understanding of preex-
isting category-boundaries.' 4  Consequently, judges performed the
task of "boundary pricking."' Courts needed to place various legisla-
tive actions in either the public-good category or the private-interest
category. In doing so, the courts traced a boundary between the
common good, on the one side, and partial and private interests, on
the other side, by pricking one point (or case) at a time.' 6 The result
of this judicial boundary pricking was to sketch the contours of a pro-
tected private realm of individual liberty and property. Given the na-
ture of republican democracy, however, the courts did not focus so
much on the definition of individual rights and liberties as on the
legislatures' actions and purposes. In each case, the question became
whether the legislature, in the eyes of the court, had acted for the
common good. If the legislature had acted for the common good,
then the court would uphold the government's action. If the legisla-
ture had instead acted for the benefit of private or partial interests,
then the court would invalidate the government's action. In the
words of Chancellor James Kent, "private interests must be made sub-
servient to the general interest of the community."'7
The preeminent constitutional law treatise of the late-nineteenth
and early-twentieth centuries was Thomas Cooley's Constitutional Limi-
tations,8 first published in 1868 and, by 1910, in a seventh edition.'9
Cooley's elucidation of the judicial enforcement of constitutional lim-
its relied heavily on republican democratic principles. Cooley began
by declaring that the people are sovereign: "[t]he theory of our po-
litical system is that the ultimate sovereignty is in the people, from
14 See GILLMAN, supra note 5, at 54-55 ("[T]his nineteenth-century approach to legislative
power was essentially categorical-laws either promoted the public welfare or were arbitrary
and unreasonable."); G. Edward White, Revisiting Substantive Due Process and Holmes's Lochner
Dissent, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 87, 114-17 (1997) ("In marking out the boundaries between the po-
lice power and the sphere of private autonomy, judges were merely recognizing the obvious.
They were not exercising 'judgment' in the modern sense of that term.").
15 "Boundary pricking" is G. Edward White's felicitous phrase. WHITE, supra note 5, at 36.
6 Boundary pricking, which consisted of a process by which new cases were placed in one
or another essentialist category, and consequently in one sphere of authority or another, was
the essence of guardian judicial review in constitutional law." Id.; see Gordon S. Wood, The Ori-
gins ofJudicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall Court Made More Out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 787, 806-09 (1999) (emphasizing how the courts separated law from politics to help justify
judicial review). Chief Justice William Howard Taft would write: "The boundary of the police
power beyond which its exercise becomes an invasion of the guaranty of liberty under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitutions is not easy to mark. Our court has been la-
boriously engaged in pricking out a line in successive cases." Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261
U.S. 525, 562 (1923) (Taft, C.J., dissenting).
17 JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *340.
is THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1868).
19 Eben Moglen, Holmes's Legacy and the New Constitutional History, 108 HARV. L. REV. 2027,
2033 (1995).
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whom springs all legitimate authority."' Cooley then explained how
the requirement that legislation be for the common good both em-
powered and limited the government.21 According to Cooley, the
government always retained the legislative power to enact any laws for
the common good. When discussing the definition of due process or
the law of the land, Cooley quoted approvingly from Daniel Webster:
"The meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, prop-
erty, and immunities under the protection of general rules which
govern society. '2  Cooley observed that under the state police power
"persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosper-
ity of the State."2 3 Indeed, at one point, Cooley stated that the legisla-
tive power "must be considered as practically absolute, whether it op-
erate according to natural justice or not. '24 Not coincidentally, then,
Cooley did not encourage judicial activism. Courts are not superior
to legislatures, he reasoned, and therefore the courts' power of judi-
cial review over legislative acts should only "be entered upon with re-
luctance and hesitation.,
2
Even so, Cooley emphasized that the requirement that legislation
be for the common good constrained the government; after all, the
title of his treatise was Constitutional Limitations. It is "the very nature
of free government," he wrote, for the legislature "to make laws for
the public good, and not for the benefit of individuals., 26  Conse-
quently, "[t]he bills of rights in the American constitutions forbid
that parties shall be deprived of property except by the law of the
land; but if the prohibition had been omitted, a legislative enactment
to pass one man's property over to another would nevertheless be
0 COOLEY, supra note 18, at 28.
21 Id.
Id. at 353-54 (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 581
(1819) (statement of Mr. Webster for the plaintiffs in error)).
23 Id. at 573-74. Therefore, Cooley added,
[a]ll contracts and all rights, it is held, are subject to this [police] power; and regulations
which affect them may not only be established by the State, but must also be subject to
change from time to time, with reference to the general well-being of the community, as
circumstances change, or as experience demonstrates the necessity.
Id. at 574.
24 Id. at 168. The surrounding passage is worth noting:
The rule of law upon this subject appears to be, that, except where the constitution has
imposed limits upon the legislative power, it must be considered as practically absolute,
whether it operate according to natural justice or not in any particular case. The courts
are not the guardians of the rights of the people of the State, unless those rights are se-
cured by some constitutional provision which comes within the judicial cognizance.
Id.
Id. at 160. "[I]t is only where [the courts] find that the legislature has failed to keep
within its constitutional limits, that they are at liberty to disregard its action .... " Id.
26 Id. at 129 (emphasis added).
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void., 27 More generally, Cooley explained, legislatures are restrained
from enacting laws for partial or private interests:
[E]very one has a right to demand that he be governed by general rules,
and a special statute that singles his case out as one to be regulated by a
different law from that which is applied in all similar cases would not be
legitimate legislation, but an arbitrary mandate, unrecognized in free
government. Mr. Locke has said of those who make the laws: "They are
to govern by promulgated, established laws, not to be varied in particular
cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at court and
the countryman at plough"; and this may be justly said to have become a
maxim in the law, by which may be tested the authority and binding force
28of legislative enactments.
This limit on legislative power translated into a demand for equality
under the law: "[s]pecial privileges are obnoxious, and discrimina-
,,29tions against persons or classes are still more so ....
The influence of Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, in one edition
after another, underscores the continuing importance of republican
democratic principles. Yet industrialization, immigration, and ur-
banization placed republican democracy under enormous pressures
in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. The meaning of
the common good was constantly contested and subject to change. °
During this time, the economic ideology of laissez-faire became in-
creasingly influential and thus shaped judges' interpretations of the
common good. Many judicial decisions seemed to shift the border
between public goods and partial or private interests so as to expand
the private realm of protected economic interests (despite the fact
that, in theory, the category-boundaries were preexisting).
27 Id. at 175.
29 Id. at 391-92 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 393. In a case decided in 1870,Judge Cooley elaborated the nexus between equality
and the prohibition against partial or private legislation:
But the discrimination by the State between different classes of occupations, and the fa-
voring of one at the expense of the rest, whether that one be farming or banking, mer-
chandising or milling, printing or railroading, is not legitimate legislation, and is an in-
vasion of that equality of ight and privilege which is a maxim in State government.
When the door is once opened to it, there is no line at which we can stop and say with
confidence that thus far we may go with safety and propriety, but no further. Every hon-
est employment is honorable; it is beneficial to the public; it deserves encouragement.
The more successful we can make it, the more does it generally subserve the public
good. But it is not the business of the State to make discriminations in favor of one class
against another, or in favor of one employment against another. The State can have no
favorites. Its business is to protect the industry of all, and to give all the benefit of equal
laws.
People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452, 486-87 (1870), overruled by Burdick v. Harbor Springs Lumber
Co., 133 N.W. 822 (Mich. 1911).
30 See THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 18-21 (1992) (discussing contested nineteenth-century
meanings of republicanism).
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Two Supreme Court decisions would, for future generations,
epitomize this era: Allgeyer v. Louisiana,3' decided in 1897, and
Lochner v. New York," decided in 1905. In holding that a state restric-
tion on insurance contracts violated due process, the Allgeyer Court
solidified the laissez-faire flavored transformation of free labor into
"liberty to contract. ,33 The ideology of free labor, originating during
the mid-nineteenth century in opposition to slave labor, had pro-
vided a rallying cry for Abraham Lincoln's Republican Party before,
during, and after the Civil War. Justice Rufus Peckham's unanimous
Allgeyer opinion acknowledged the "right of the State to en-
act ... legislation in the legitimate exercise of its police or other
powers as to it may seem proper. 34 But such exercises of the police
power, the Court stressed, must be consistent with the individual
rights and liberties protected by a republican democratic form of
government. In particular, Peckham emphasized,
[t]he "liberty" mentioned in [the fourteenth] amendment means not
only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of
his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the
right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties, to be
free to use them in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn
his livelihood by any lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or avocation,
and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper,
necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the
purposes above mentioned.
35
Quoting Justice John Marshall Harlan, Peckham explicitly linked lib-
erty to contract with republican democratic equality: the individual
should enjoy "'upon terms of equality with all others in similar cir-
cumstances ... the privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade,
and of acquiring, holding, and selling property.'"36 Finally, it should
be noted, liberty to contract was not expressly enumerated in the
constitutional text, though it was tied to the enumerated right of due
process.
Interestingly, during this Supreme Court era, the Court itself
would cite Allgeyer far more often than it would cite the more re-
nowned (or infamous) Lochner.37 Regardless, Lochner itself perfectly
exemplifies the nature and difficulty of judicial review under republi-
31 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
32 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
" 165 U.S. at 591; see Bernstein, supra note 5, at 43 (discussing how the Court continued to
invoke "liberty of contract" language following Allgeyer).
34 165 U.S. at 591.
35 Id. at 589.
Id. at 589-90 (quoting Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684 (1888)).
37 STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO
POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 104 (2000).
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can democracy in this time of political strain. The case arose from a
due process challenge to a state law that restricted the number of
hours employees could work in bakeries (ten per day and sixty per
week). In a five-to-four decision, the Court invalidated the law.
Peckham's majority opinion began by acknowledging that the state
could exercise its police power to regulate for "the safety, health,
morals, and general welfare of the public. 8  Moreover, Peckham
added, "[b]oth property and liberty are held on such reasonable
conditions as may be imposed [pursuant to the police] power.0 9 Yet,
simultaneously, the Fourteenth Amendment prescribed "a limit to
the valid exercise of the police power by the State., 4 The state can-
not infringe on individual rights and liberties under the "mere pre-
text" of exercising its police powers for the common good." Thus,
the Court framed the issue:
[i]s this a fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police power
of the State, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interfer-
ence with the right of the individual to his personal liberty or to enter
into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him appro-
priate or necessary for the support of himself and his family?
41
Put in different words, could the law be justified as pursuing the
common good, or was it merely favoring partial or private interests?
The Court considered two alternative justifications for the statute: as
a regulation of labor relations, and as a regulation for health pur-
poses. Given that bakers were "equal in intelligence and capacity to
men in other trades or manual occupations," Peckham readily con-
cluded that the statute, if viewed as "a purely labor law," did not pro-
mote the common good: "[A] law like the one before us involves nei-
ther the safety, the morals nor the welfare of the public, and ... the
interest of the public is not in the slightest degree affected by such an
act."43 Hence, if the law were to be upheld, it must be as a health
regulation. But, Peckham reasoned, "there can be no fair doubt that
the trade of a baker, in and of itself, is not an unhealthy one to that
degree which would authorize the legislature to interfere with the
right to labor."44 Indeed, Peckham suspected that the New York legis-
lature, similar to the legislatures of other states passing social welfare
38 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905), abrogated byW. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (5-4
decision), and superseded by statute, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060, as
recognized in Imars v. Contractors Mfg. Servs., Inc., 165 F.3d 27 (6th Cir. 1998).
31 Id.
40 Id. at 56.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 57.
44 Id. at 59.
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laws, had been disingenuous in its expression of purpose.45  And,
when focused on the true legislative purpose, the Court saw the stat-
ute for what it was, impermissible class legislation:
It seems to us that the real object and purpose were simply to regulate
the hours of labor between the master and his employ~s (all being men,
suijuris), in a private business, not dangerous in any degree to morals or
46in any real and substantial degree, to the health of the employ~s.
The dissenters agreed with the majority on the need to apply the
fundamental principles of republican democracy. Disagreement
arose over the application of those principles in this particular case.
Harlan's dissenting opinion, joined by Justices William R. Day and
Edward D. White, began by focusing on the interplay between the
state's police power and individual rights and liberties: "[L]iberty of
contract [like other rights and liberties] is subject to such regulations
as the State may reasonably prescribe for the common good and the
well-being of society."4 7 But was a restriction on bakers' hours of em-
ployment in the common good? Harlan reviewed the evidence con-
cerning the health of bakers and concluded that "there is room for
debate and for an honest difference of opinion., 48 Unlike the major-
ity, however, Harlan refused to presume that the legislature had been
disingenuous; instead, given the uncertain connection between bak-
ers' hours and their health, Harlan deferred to the legislative judg-
ment: "We are not to presume that the State of New York has acted
in bad faith. Nor can we assume that its legislature acted without due
deliberation, or that it did not determine this question upon the full-
est attainable information, and for the common good.",9  Arguing
similarly, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., also dissented. Quite
simply, the Court should have deferred to the legislative judgment
because "[a] reasonable man might think [the disputed statute] a
45 Id. at 63-64.
46 Id. at 64. Compare GILLMAN, supra note 5, at 127-29 (arguing that the Lochner majority
found the law to be impermissible class legislation), and WHITE, supra note 5, at 246-51 (analyz-
ing Lochner consistently with Gillman's approach), with Bernstein, supra note 5, at 23-26 (criti-
cizing Gillman's argument).
47 198 U.S. at 68 (Harlan,J., dissenting). Harlan wrote:
I take it to be firmly established that what is called the liberty of contract may, within cer-
tain limits, be subjected to regulations designed and calculated to promote the general
welfare or to guard the public health, the public morals or the public safety. "The liberty
secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within its jurisdiction
does not import," this court has recently said, "an absolute right in each person to be, at
all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold re-
straints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good."
Id. at 67 (quotingJacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905)).
48 Id. at 72.
49 Id. at 73. "Our duty," Harlan continued, "is to sustain the statute as not being in conflict
with the Federal Constitution, for the reason-and such is an all-sufficient reason-it is not
shown to be plainly and palpably inconsistent with that instrument." Id.
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proper measure on the score of health."50 Moreover, Holmes added,
the majority's demarcation between the common good and private or
partial interests seemed to be unduly influenced by Social Darwinist
or laissez-faire ideology. In Holmes's terse prose, "[t]he Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."
5'
II. PLURALIST DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OFJUDICLAL REVIEW
During the 1920s and 1930s, numerous political, social, and cul-
tural factors led to the downfall of republican democratic govern-
ment. In its stead, by the early- to mid-1930s, the practice of pluralist
democracy had taken hold. A full exploration of this transition is be-
yond the scope of this article, but in short, republican democracy,
originally built on agrarian economics, widespread land-ownership,
and Protestant values, no longer fit the urban, industrial, and cultur-
ally diverse America that consolidated between the World Wars.
The new regime-pluralist democracy-was marked by a widespread
opportunity to participate in politics. One did not need to qualify to
participate by demonstrating civic virtue. In particular, during the
thirties, many ethnic and immigrant urbanites who had previously
been discouraged from participating in national politics became vot-
ers, supporting the New Deal. Moreover, pluralist democracy ac-
knowledged that politics was about the pursuit of self-interest. Legis-
latures no longer supposedly pursued the common good. Instead,
legislators responded to the requests, demands, and blandishments of
interest groups. Legislation arose from interest-group battles and
compromises. Thus, for example, legislation favoring labor unions
was no longer condemned as class legislation, favoring partial or pri-
vate interests. To be sure, labor constituted an interest group, but
now, so did management; all societal groups concerned about politics
were understood to be interest groups. Pursuing self-interest became
normal and legitimate.
50 Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes believed that "[m]en whom [he] certainly
could not pronounce unreasonable would uphold it as a first installment of a general regula-
tion of the hours of work. Whether in the latter aspect it would be open to the charge of ine-
quality [he thought] it unnecessary to discuss." Id.
51 Id. at 75. Holmes elaborated: "[A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular
economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or
of laissez faire." Id.
52 See ANTHoNYJ. BADGER, THE NEW DEAL: THE DEPRESSION YEARS, 1933-1940, at 58 (1989)
(explaining divisions within American society); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL: 1932-1940, at 332 (1963) (emphasizing the participation of
former political outsiders in the New Deal coalition); ROBERT S. MCELVAINE, THE GREAT
DEPRESSION: AMERICAN, 1929-1941, at 197-98 (1984) (discussing changing values in America).
53 See, e.g., infra note 182 and accompanying text.
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While the practice of pluralist democracy had become entrenched
by the mid-1930s, two important institutions still needed to adjust to
the transition: the academy (particularly in law and political sci-
ence), and the courts (especially the Supreme Court). By the mid- to
late-1930s, academics and other intellectuals already were struggling
to explain and legitimate the new democratic practices. By the early
1950s, the contours of a new theory of democracy-a theory of plural-
ist democracy-had already been developed. Eventually, the political
scientist Robert A. Dahl would articulate the theory of pluralist de-
mocracy more comprehensively perhaps than any other scholar.
Writing in 1956, Dahl explained that pluralist democracy, like repub-
lican democracy, rested on "popular sovereignty. 54 Yet, contrary to a
republican democratic approach, Dahl acknowledged the primacy of
self-interest: "If unrestrained by external checks, any given individual
or group of individuals will tyrannize over others. '' " Thus, a democ-
ratic theory must encompass "processes" that effectuate legitimate in-
terests while simultaneously controlling illegitimate interests. Le-
gitimacy and illegitimacy, moreover, must be determined through the
processes themselves. Dahl thus identified eight processes that were
conditions or prerequisites for the operation of a democracy. 56 For
instance, in an election, the weight of each individual's vote is "iden-
tical;" a candidate or policy alternative "with the greatest number of
votes is declared the winning choice;' 57 and "orders of elected offi-
cials are executed.",58  Dahl admitted that "no human organiza-
tion.., has ever met or is ever likely to meet [all] eight conditions.'
9
Yet, some organizations, called "polYarchies," came close; he included
the United States in this group. Finally, Dahl maintained that
American culture nurtured a needed consensus regarding democ-
ratic processes. Individuals and interest groups might clash in politi-
cal struggles, but they shared certain elementary cultural norms that
prevented the- society from splintering into embittered fragments.
"To assume that this country has remained democratic because of its
Constitution seems to me an obvious reversal of the relation," Dahl
wrote, "it is much more plausible to suppose that the Constitution has
remained because our society is essentially democratic."6' And our
54 ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 34 (1956).
55 Id. at 6.
56 See id. at 67-71 (detailing the eight processes).
57 Id. at 67.
58 Id. at 71.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 74.
61 Id. at 143.
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democratic culture encouraged self-interested individuals to bargain
62and generally to accept moderate compromises.
Subsequently, Dahl elaborated his democratic theory, which was
unequivocally pluralist. "[T]he ancient belief," he explained "that
citizens both could and should pursue the public good rather than
their private ends became more difficult to sustain, and even impos-
sible, as 'the public good' fragmented into individual and group in-
terests." Dahl continued to emphasize popular sovereignty and
process. "Democracy means, literally, rule by the people.... In order
to rule, the people must have some way of ruling, a process for rul-
ing.06 4 Thus, Dahl arrived at his central question: "What are the dis-
tinctive characteristics of a democratic process of government? 65 He
specified five criteria that a "perfect democratic government" would
satisfy. 66 The first and foremost criterion or condition for democracy
is "effective participation., 67 "Throughout the process of making
binding decisions, citizens ought to have an adequate opportunity,
and an equal opportunity, for expressing their preferences as to the
final outcome," Dahl wrote.6 8 "They must have adequate and equal
opportunities for placing questions on the agenda and for expressing
reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another.,
69
Put in different words, as Dahl explained, the right to self-
government is a "general moral right"70-"one of the most fundamen-
tal rights a person can possess" 7 '-which "translates into an array of
moral and legal rights, many of which are specific and legally en-
forceable."72 That is, the five criteria requisite to democracy require
that participants possess certain enforceable rights, such as freedom
of speech and freedom of the press. "[I]f the rights are ab-
sent,... the democratic process does not exist. 73 Well, then, Dahl
asked, what happens "if a majority acting by perfectly democratic
procedures deprives a minority of its freedom of speech?, 74 Dahl's
answer: it's impossible. "[I]n such a case the majority would not-
could not-be acting by 'perfectly democratic procedures' [because
these specific rights, like free speech] ... are integral to the democ-
62 Id. at 4.
6, ROBERTA. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 30 (1989).
64 Id. at 106.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 109.
67 Id.
68 Id.
61) Id.
70 Id. at 170.
71 Id. at 169.
72 Id. at 170.
73 Id.
74 Id.
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ratic process."75  Although pluralist democratic theory focuses on
process, the process requires the protection of certain substantive
rights.76 Otherwise, individuals would be unable "to participate fully,
as equal citizens, in the making of all the collective decisions by which
they are bound."" Dahl concluded, therefore, that democracy has
limits "built into the very nature of the process itself. If you exceed
those limits, then you necessarily violate the democratic process.
7 8
Finally, Dahl returned to his emphasis on democratic culture. If a
majority is bent on infringing the rights of a minority, Dahl admitted,
the logic of the democratic process might not protect the minority.
"In practice .... the democratic process isn't likely to be preserved
for very long unless the people of a country preponderantly believe
that it's desirable and unless their belief comes to be embedded in
their habits, practices, and culture. 79 Without a supportive culture,
courts and other governmental institutions will not be able to pre-
serve democratic processes.80
With regard to the judiciary vis-A-vis the emergence of pluralist
democracy, the Court's continued application of republican democ-
ratic principles in most scenarios lasted not only through the 1920s
but also into the 1930s. The reasons for the persistence of republican
democratic judicial review were threefold. First, while the practice of
pluralist democracy began to emerge during the early 1930s, the the-
ory did not crystallize until later in the decade. Living through the
transformation of democracy, many observers did not immediately
recognize or grasp the ramifications of the transition. Second, the
institutional practice of adjudication, with its emphasis on stare de-
cisis, has a natural reliance on the past, on tradition, on precedents.
As such, one would expect the judiciary often to lag behind other in-
stitutions when change is afoot. Third, and related to the previous
point, federal judges (including Supreme Court Justices) receive life-
time appointments. In a time of critical transition, such as the 1930s,
many judges would have nonetheless matured, learned their profes-
sional norms, and been appointed to the federal bench during the
prior democratic regime. Such judges would be apt to continue ap-
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 175.
78 Id. at 172.
-9 Id.
so When Dahl uses the precise term "pluralist democracy" he refers to a democratic govern-
ment where "[i]nstead of a single center of sovereign power there [are] multiple centers of
power, none of which is or can be wholly sovereign." ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY
IN THE UNITED STATES 24 (1967). See also ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST
DEMOCRACY 4-5 (1982) (discussing elements of pluralist democracy).
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plying the principles and doctrines to which they had become accus-
tomed earlier in their careers.
Thus, as had been true during the pre-World War I era, the Su-
preme Court continued to resolve numerous challenges to govern-
mental actions by determining whether the action was either for the
common good or for partial or private interests. For instance, in Ad-
kins v. Children's Hospital,"' decided in 1923, the Court held that a Dis-
trict of Columbia law setting minimum wages for women and chil-
dren violated due process. The Court identified several types of cases
where it had previously found statutes promoting the common good
or public welfare, but also emphasized that due process protected
freedom of contract, including for employment contracts. The ma-
jority opinion bolstered this latter point by citing a long string of
precedents, including Allgeyer v. Louisiana and Lochner v. New York."'
Then, examining the disputed statute setting minimum wages for
employees, the Court reasoned that it favored partial or private inter-
ests: "The law takes account of the necessities of only one party to the
contract. It ignores the necessities of the employer by compelling
him to pay not less than a certain sum .... ,,84 In other words, the
statute amounted to impermissible class legislation, "a naked, arbi-
trary exercise of power that ... cannot be allowed to stand under the
Constitution of the United States. ''s5 The Court acknowledged that
"[t]he liberty of the individual to do as he pleases, even in innocent
matters, is not absolute. It must frequently yield to the common
good ... ,,86 Yet, while the Court must give "great weight 8 7 to legisla-
tive assertions of the common good, the Justices cannot accept such a
legislative statement if it appears to be "a mere pretext."8 s Holmes
dissented, reasoning that when the common good or public welfare is
unclear, as in this case, the Court should uphold the legislative de-
termination so long as it was reasonable.8 9 But the majority found in-
stead that its "plain duty" was to invalidate this law; doing so was nec-
essary to promote the common good.90 Justice Sutherland explained:
"[t]o sustain the individual freedom of action contemplated by the
Constitution, is not to strike down the common good but to exalt it;
81 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
82 Id. at 545 ("Within this liberty [protected by the Due Process Clause] are contracts of em-
ployment of labor....").
83 Id.
84 Id. at 557.
85 Id. at 559.
86 Id. at 561.
87 Id. at 544.
88 Id. at 548-49.
89 Id. at 571 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("If the ... legislature should accept [an opinion of
reasonableness] ... I should not feel myself able to contradict it. ).
90 Id. at 561 (majority opinion).
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for surely the good of society as a whole cannot be better served than
by the preservation a ainst arbitrary restraint of the liberties of its
constituent members." To be sure, such judicial determinations of
the common good varied with the facts of each case. One year later,
for example, in Radice v. New York,92 the Court held that a state law re-
stricting the hours of employment for women in restaurants did not
constitute impermissible class legislation. The legislature justifiably
concluded that the law would "preserve and promote the public
health and welfare. 93
A. Crisis and Change
The Court's application of the principles of republican democ-
ratic judicial review became more problematic when FDR and Con-
gress began to implement the New Deal agenda. The national and
state governments' efforts to boost the country out of the Depression
by regulating the economy and society to an unprecedented degree
inevitably clashed with the Court's traditional methods of judicial re-
view. To be sure, the Court occasionally upheld legislation it found
to promote the common good, and even hinted that it might respond
favorably to the pull of pluralist democracy. In 1934, in Home Build-
ing and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,94 Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes's ma-
jority opinion explained that the societal changes engendered by in-
dustrialization had produced "a growing appreciation of public
needs."9"5 Similarly, that same year, Justice OwenJ. Roberts's majority
opinion in Nebbia v. New York,96 upholding state regulations of milk
prices, reasoned that the "category of businesses affected with a pub-
lic interest" was flexible and expandable.97 Both these cases suggested
that the Court might be ready to enlarge the republican democratic.
common good to such a degree that the concept would become
meaningless; any interests or values could, in theory, be deemed
equivalent to the common good.9s Moreover, some Justices elsewhere
91 Id.
92 264 U.S. 292 (1924).
93 Id. at 294. In another case, the Court invalidated a zoning ordinance because it did not
"bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." Nectow v.
City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928).
94 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
95 Id. at 442.
96 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
97 Id. at 536.
98 Cf Aleinikoff, supra note 5, at 963-64 (characterizing Blaisdellas an early balancing case);
Bernstein, supra note 5, at 50-51 & n.284 (arguing that Blaisdell reflected an expanded public
interest doctrine); Harry N. Scheiber, Economic Liberty and the Modern State, in THE STATE AND
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 122, 156-57 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1998) (arguing that Nebbia mani-
fested significant change in Contract Clause doctrine).
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further signaled that they were ready to turn the Court. Harlan F.
Stone, in the early 1920s, while still Dean of Columbia Law School,
expressed reservations about sociological jurisprudence. He worried
that a judicial assessment of social interests would be lacking in
methodology and thus lead to unprincipled decision-making. 9 Yet,
in a 1936 address at Harvard Law School, now-Justice Stone advo-
cated for a type of 'judicial lawmaking" that suggested, albeit am-
biguously, an openness to pluralist democratic processes. "" Empha-
sizing the common law, Stone denounced "mechanical"'0' reliance on
precedents that reduced the law to "a dry and sterile formalism.'0 2
Instead, ajudge should recognize that sometimes "he performs essen-
tially the function of the legislator, and in a real sense makes law.
1 03
In doing so, the judge should appraise and compare social values, or
in other words, assess "relative weights of the social and economic ad-
vantages.., in favor of one rule rather than another."'0 4 Thus,just as
pluralist democracy was becoming entrenched in actual political
practices, Stone was arguing that not only should legislators weigh
competing interests and values, but that judges should do so as well.
Indeed, though focused on the common law, Stone extended his
comments to constitutional law, where "more often than in private
law, [the issue] is between the conflicting interests of the individual
and of society as a whole.'00
Nonetheless, in 1935, the Court's hinted readiness to embrace
pluralist democracy seemed to vanish, like a will-o'-the-wisp. Both
Blaisdell and Nebbia were close five-to-four decisions, with the same
four conservative dissenters, sometimes disparaged as the "Four
Horsemen": James C. McReynolds, Willis Van Devanter, George
Sutherland, and Pierce Butler. Moreover, despite Roberts's Nebbia
opinion, he generally adhered to republican democratic principles
and often proved to be the swing vote in close cases, frequently join-
ing the Four Horsemen though occasionally voting with the more
progressive-liberal Justices: Stone, Benjamin Cardozo, Louis D.
Brandeis, and quite often, Hughes, who was perhaps more of a cen-
trist, like Roberts. Then, in a spate of 1935 and 1936 cases invalidat-
9 For Stone's criticisms of sociological jurisprudence, see Harlan F. Stone, Some Aspects of the
Problem of Law Simplification, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 327-28 (1923), and Harlan F. Stone, Book
Review, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 382, 384 (1922), a review of BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF
THEJUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
100 Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, Address Before the Conference
on the Future of the Common Law (Aug. 19-21, 1936), in 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 (1936).
101 Id. at 19.
102 Id. at 10.
103 Id. at 20.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 22.
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ing key New Deal statutes, as well as a number of cases involving state
social welfare enactments, Roberts repeatedly joined the conserva-
tives. 1 6 Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co.'0 7 struck down
the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934 as being beyond Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause.'08  Reasoning that the statute
contravened the common good, the Court categorized it as class leg-
islation: "an attempt for social ends to impose by sheer fiat non-
contractual incidents upon the relation of employer and employee,
not as a rule or regulation of commerce and transportation between
the States, but as a means of assuring a particular class of employees
against old age dependency."'0 9 As such, the legislation did not foster
"the railroads' duty to serve the public [good or interest] in interstate
transportation.""0 Furthering only "the social welfare of the worker,"
the Act constituted an impermissible regulation of commerce."' In
short order, the Court invalidated the National Industrial Recovery
Act, the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, and provisions of the Ag-
ricultural Adjustment Act. In Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,"2 the Court
clarified that acting for the common good was a necessary but not
sufficient condition for establishing the constitutionality of congres-
sional legislation."' Not only must a statute be for the common good,
but Congress must also act pursuant to one of its specifically enumer-
ated powers."14 And the Court consistently resolved such issues of
congressional power in accordance with a formal conceptualism simi-
lar to that used to determine whether a governmental action fur-
thered only partial or private interests. For instance, in Carter Coal,
the Court distinguished national and local activities as if they were
preexisting a priori categories. Reasoning that mining, like manufac-
turing, growing crops, and other types of production, was "a purely
106 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936) (invalidating Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936) (invalidating Agricultural Ad-
justnent Act provisions); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551
(1935) (invalidating National Industrial Recovery Act). The Court also reviewed state legislative
action to determine if it conflicted with constitutional principles. Compare Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447 (1934) (upholding the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium
Law), with Morehead v. N.Y. ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936) (invalidating state mini-
mum wage law for women).
107 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
108 Id. at 347 ("[T]his power [to regulate interstate commerce] must be exercised in subjec-
tion to the guarantee of due process of law found in the Fifth Amendment.").
109 Id. at 374 (emphasis added).
110 Id.
I Id. at 368.
112 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
13 Id. at 291 ("[F]or nothing is more certain than that beneficent aims, however great or well
directed, can never serve in lieu of constitutional power.").
114 Id. ("Whether the end sought to be attained by an act of Congress is legitimate is wholly a
matter of constitutional power and not at all of legislative discretion.").
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local activity," the Court concluded that Congress's attempt to regu-
late bituminous coal mining exceeded its constitutional powers.
Even Stone and the other progressive-liberal Justices most often
analyzed cases in accord with the traditional structures of republican
democratic judicial review. True, Stone's Harvard address had sug-
gested he might be ready to move to a form of judicial review more
consistent with pluralist democracy, but much of that ambiguous ad-
dress had been more consistent with sociological jurisprudence-and
hence republican democracy-than with the newer legal realist juris-
prudence, which hewed more closely to the emerging pluralist de-
mocracy.16 Stone cited the renowned Roscoe Pound as well as other
sociological jurists but did not cite a single leading realist author."
7
More important, after suggesting that courts might need to weigh in-
dividual interests against societal interests to resolve constitutional is-
sues, Stone retreated to republican democratic rhetoric by noting the
"incalculable social worth" of individual rights."" In other words, in-
dividual liberty was meaningful, it seemed, only insofar as it contrib-
uted to a common good:
Just where the line is to be drawn which marks the boundary between the
appropriate field of individual liberty and right and that of government
action for the larger good, so as to insure the least sacrifice of both types
of social advantage, is the perpetual question of constitutional law.
Thus, unsurprisingly, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
120
the sick chicken case, Stone joined all of the other Justices in unani-
mously invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act; Hughes's
opinion reasoned in part that Congress had exceeded its power. 2' In
United States v. Butler, - Stone's dissenting opinion, joined by Brandeis
and Cardozo, criticized the majority for invalidating Agricultural Ad-
justment Act provisions that promoted the "general welfare" and ful-
filled a "public purpose.' 22 In Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Rail-
11 Id. at 304.
116 See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
17 See Stone, supra note 100, at 13 n.13, 14 n. 16 (citing Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legis-
lation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908)).
18 Id. at 22.
19 Id. Stone also discussed Justice Cardozo's 1921 book, in which Justice Cardozo argued
that a judge's most important consideration when deciding a case should be "the method of
sociology"-that is, an evaluation of "the welfare of society." Id. at 20; BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO,
THE NATURE OF THEJUDICIAL PROCEss 66 (1921).
10 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
121 Id. at 529. In Schechter, Cardozo wrote a concurring opinion joined by Stone. Id. at 551-
55 (Cardozo,J., concurring).
122 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
123 Id. at 86 (Stone, J., dissenting).
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road Co., 24 Hughes wrote a dissenting and concurring opinion, joined
by Cardozo, Brandeis, and Stone.11 Concluding contrary to the ma-
jority (the Four Horsemen plus Roberts) that one of the disputed sec-
tions of the Railroad Retirement Act should be upheld, Hughes rea-
soned that the provision did not constitute impermissible class
legislation because it promoted the common good, even if it also im-
posed "unequal burdens" on railroads. 126 However, these same Jus-
tices-Cardozo, Brandeis, and Stone-concurred with the majority's
conclusion that another statutory section was beyond congressional
power, though the liberals believed the invalid section could be sev-
ered from the rest of the statute, thus preserving the gist of the con-
gressional program.127
The Court's adherence to republican democratic principles pro-
voked the ire of many intellectuals. Robert Hale, a political scientist
associated with the legal realist movement, and Morris Cohen, a legal
philosopher, each published articles in the mid-1930s exemplifying
these critiques. 128 As described by Cohen, the Court subscribed to a
"cult of freedom.' ' 29 From the Justices' perspective, "an ideally desir-
able system of law" would recognize legal obligations as "aris[ing]
only out of the will of the individual contracting freely."'20 Any re-
straint on such freedom would necessarily be detrimental. Both
Cohen and Hale criticized this vision of an ideal legal system in three
ways. First, one party to a contract typically lacks true freedom, espe-
cially in the employment context. While the Supreme Court rhapso-
dized about the public value of liberty to contract, most employees
124 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
125 Hughes wrote: "this Court has directly sustained the grouping of railroads for the pur-
pose of regulation in .enforcing a common policy deemed to be essential to an adequate na-
tional system of transportation, even though it resulted in taking earnings of a strong road to
help a weak one." Id. at 386 (Hughes, CJ., dissenting). Hughes, however, also used language
suggestive of pluralist democracy: "Congress was entitled to weigh the advantages of such a sys-
tem, as against inequalities which it would inevitably produce, and reach a conclusion as to the
policy best suited to the needs of the country." Id. at 387.
126 Id. at 385 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
127 See id. at 389 (regarding Hughes's reasoning on an invalid but severable provision). In
Carter Coal, Hughes dissented, but only in part. He agreed with the majority (the Four Horse-
men plus Roberts) that production, particularly mining, was not commerce and, therefore, in
some instances, beyond congressional control. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 317-24
(1936) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (reasoning that unconstitu-
tional provisions should be severed from constitutional ones). For more information on the
Four Horsemen, see LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 5, at 214-15. While Leuchtenburg emphasizes
the political underpinnings of the Court's jurisprudence in the 1930s, Barry Cushman empha-
sizes legal doctrine and lawyering. See generally CUSHMAN, supra note 5.
128 Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REv. 553 (1933); Robert L. Hale, Force
and the State: A Comparison of "Political" and "Economic" Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 149
(1935).
129 Cohen, supra note 128, at 559.
130 Id. at 558.
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either accepted the employer's offer or starved. As Hale elaborated,
private entities (individuals or corporations) often exert coercive
power over other individuals who, lacking reasonable alternatives, are
forced to accept inequitable contracts.' The Justices' laissez-faire-
inspired interpretation of the common good, in which the absence of
governmental regulation supposedly maximized individual liberty,
contravened social reality. Second, Cohen and Hale questioned the
Justices' republican democratic assumption that there existed a pri-
vate sphere of individual freedom distinct from a public sphere of
governmental action, with the border between the spheres demar-
cated by the common good. Cohen and Hale argued that duties and
obligations in the so-called private realm exist only because of gov-
ernmental support; property and contract rights arise and are en-
forceable only if the courts recognize and sanction them.1 32 In Hale's
words, governmental officials, including judges, effectively
"carry ... out the mandates of property owners."' Third, and follow-
ing from their first two arguments, both Cohen and Hale suggested
that the Court should modify its approach to judicial review in accor-
dance with the realities of democracy-that is, in accordance with the
emergent pluralist democracy. 134 Cohen explained that Americans
had never strictly followed the "cult of freedom.' 3 5 Even those who
celebrated it in the 1930s still sought governmental assistance for
their own businesses.16 The true question, Cohen declared, was not
how to minimize governmental interference in some ostensibly pri-
vate sphere of freedom; rather the question was "what interests
should be protected and who should control the government.' 37 In a
similar vein, Hale maintained that when Congress enacted economic
or social welfare legislation, it did not infringe liberty. 13  Instead,
Congress chose among the competing interests of different individu-
als and groups.19
131 Cf Hale, supra note 128, at 168 (discussing instances when a person is compelled to act or
to refrain from acting out of necessity).
132 SeeCohen, supra note 128, at 562.
133 Hale, supra note 128, at 198.
1 See Cohen, supra note 128, at 558-62; Hale, supra note 128, at 198-99.
15 Cohen, supra note 128, at 561.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 565.
138 Hale, supra note 128, at 200-01.
139 See id. ("[W]hen a state passes certain social legislation, there is a necessity of making a
choice between the preservation of one kind of property right or liberty and another .... ."); see
also Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SC. Q.
470, 470 (1923) (emphasizing the economic impact of governmental restrictions). See generally
2 LOUIS B. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BYJUDICIARY (1932) (arguing that the Supreme Court was
frustrating the democratic will).
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Other realists denounced the Lochner-era Justices for their osten-
sible reliance on formal doctrinal categories. The Justices wrote
opinions suggesting that these doctrinal categories, including the dis-
tinction between the common good and partial or private interests,
mandated the case outcomes. The Justices claimed, in short, to de-
cide in accordance with the rule of law. But from the realist perspec-
tive, judges were no more rational than were other humans. They
were subject to the same irrational impulses and displayed the same
idiosyncratic behaviors. Thurman Arnold explained that the legal
system, like other human institutions, embodied "all sorts of contra-
dictory ideals going in different directions."'' 40 Therefore, judges and
legal scholars constituted, in effect, "a priesthood devoted to the task
of proving that which is necessarily false"-that the legal system was
rational and coherent and that judicial disputes were decided pursu-
ant to legal rules.141 Judicial opinions and jurisprudential theories
aimed "to make rational in appearance the operation of an institu-
tion which is actually mystical and dramatic. To Arnold, the ab-
surd theater of the legal system stood out in stark relief as soon as one
contemplated the adversary system, where partisan opponents en-
gaged in a bitter "trial by combat" that was bizarrely "supposed to
bring out the truth.' 43
While intellectuals like Arnold and Hale constructed complex
theoretical arguments, other critics were more decidedly political.
And once the Court began bulldozing the New Deal in 1935 and
1936, such critics intensified their harangues of the Justices. 44 After
Butler invalidated Agricultural Adjustment Act provisions, the New
York Times reported that Iowa State students hung the six majority
Justices in effigy. 45 A standard critique became that the Justices were
a group of crotchety old men out-of-step with modern times; one
newspaper called them "nine old back-number owls (appointed by by-
gone Presidents) who sit on the leafless, fruitless limb of an old dead
tree." 46 Among the Four Horsemen, in particular, Van Devanter had
been appointed in 1910, McReynolds in 1914, and Sutherland and
Butler in 1922. Only McReynolds had not been a Republican ap-
140 Thurman W. Arnold, Trial by Combat and the New Deal, 47 HARV. L. REv. 913, 919 (1934).
141 Id. at 919-20.
142 Id. at 920.
143 Id. at 922.
144 See, e.g., DREW PEARSON & ROBERT S. ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN 28-32 (1936); see also
LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 5, at 96-97, 119; Friedman, supra note 5, at 1011-19 (citing critics
of the Court).
145 AAA Plowed Under, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 12, 1936, at El (discussing decision in and reactions to
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)).
146 Russell Owen Washington, Nine Justices-and Nine Personalities, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1936, at
SM3 (referring to justices as "nine old men in black").
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pointee; Wilson had nominated him. In a bestselling 1936 book,
Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen denounced the Justices as "Nine
Old Men" who refused "to take cognizance of the speed of modern
civilization in industrial and economic development, and [denied]
posterity the right to express itself in regard to social and economic
reform in its own way.' The problem, that is, was not that the Jus-
tices were acting politically, but rather that their politics contravened
the desires of a vast American majority. And the 1936 election
seemed to prove the validity of this critique. FDR received close to
twenty-eight million popular votes compared with Alf Landon's total
of less than seventeen million.
48
In the wake of his landslide victory, Roosevelt pressed for change.
If the Court, as an institution, insisted on politically opposing the
New Deal, Roosevelt would change its politics. He could not force
the Four Horsemen to retire and to open spots for new appointees,
so he decided to ask Congress to add new positions to the Court.
Roosevelt would then be able to appoint New Deal supporters to
counterbalance the Four Horsemen. FDR, to be clear, did not hatch
his so-called Court-packing plan on his own. Congress had previously
enacted legislation to restrict federal court jurisdiction in response to
judicial decisions interfering with congressional objectives. 9 FDR
himself knew of a politically successful 1911 Court-packing threat in
Great Britain, and his Attorney General, Homer S. Cummings, had
raised the idea that a statute, rather than a constitutional amend-
ment, might be the best way to alter the makeup and politics of the
Court.50 Regardless of its sources, on February 5, 1937, Roosevelt re-
vealed his proposal in a message to the Senate. 5' Early the next
month, on March 9, Roosevelt pleaded his case for reform to the
American people in one of his radio Fireside Chats. 55 He lamented
that "chance and the disinclination of individuals to leave the Su-
preme Bench have now given us a Court in which five Justices will be
147 PEARSON & ALLEN, supra note 144, at 2-3; see Guffey Asks Inquiry of 'The Nine Old Men,' N.Y.
TIMES,Jan. 27, 1937, at 5 (detailing the importance of Pearson and Allen's book and its status as
a best-seller).
148 ERIK W. AUSTIN, POLITICAL FACTS OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1789, at 94, 97 (1986)
(Table: National Electoral and Popular Vote Cast for President).
149 See WIECEK, supra note 5, at 200-01 (discussing congressional modifications of federal
court jurisdiction).
150 See 81 CONG. REC. 877-80 (1937) (describing Cummings's recommendations);
LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 5, at 114-31 (same);James A. Henretta, Charles Evan Hughes and the
Strange Death of Liberal America, 24 LAw & HIST. REv. 115, 166 (2006) (describing FDR's knowl-
edge of the British plan); see also Friedman, supra note 5, at 1019, 1021-23 (showing increased
criticism of the Court).
151 81 CONG. REC. 877 (1937).
12 See id. at 469.
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over 75 years of age before next June and one over 70."'153 These Jus-
tices had created a "crisis" by "cast[ing] doubts on the ability of the
elected Congress to protect us against catastrophe by meeting
squarely our modern social and economic conditions. " 54 Roosevelt
thus sketched the following proposal:
[w] henever a Judge or Justice of any Federal Court has reached the age
of seventy and does not avail himself of the opportunity to retire on a
pension, a new member shall be appointed by the President then in of-
fice, with the approval, as required by the Constitution, of the Senate of
the United States.
15
5
The Court, under this proposed legislation, could have anywhere be-
tween a minimum of nine and a maximum of fifteen Justices. If im-
plemented, this plan would renderjudicial decision-making "speedier
and therefore less costly" and would "bring to the decision of social
and economic problems younger men who have had personal ex-
perience and contact with modern facts and circumstances.,
156
FDR's Court-packing plan sparked immediate controversy. Even
many of Roosevelt's congressional supporters questioned the wisdom
of the proposal, which they claimed would unduly skew the balance
of power among the three national branches, endanger individual
liberties, and diminish state sovereignty.1 57 Nonetheless, while Con-
gress debated the Court-packing plan, its fate still uncertain, the Su-
preme Court announced two decisions-West Coast Hotel Co. v. Par-
nish'5 and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 15 -that revealed a new
willingness to uphold economic and social welfare statutes. For the
most part, Roberts was responsible for the so-called "switch in time
that saved nine" because he abandoned the Four Horsemen and be-
gan to vote consistently with the more liberal Justices. 16  Yet, these
two 1937 decisions not only had enormous political ramifications-
because of Roberts's switch-but also marked the Court's acceptance
of the new regime of pluralist democracy. In the words of Yale law
153 Id. at 471.
154 Id. at 470.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 See Friedman, supra note 5, at 1038-44 (listing and discussing these criticisms of the Court-
packing plan); Three Senators Score Court Plan Here as Peril to Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1937, at
I (detailing Democratic attacks on the Court-packing plan); see also Thomas Reed Powell, Au-
thority and Freedom in a Democratic Society: Constitution, Legislatures, Courts, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 473,
483-84 (1944) (explaining that the Court-packing plan had aroused concerns about the protec-
tion of civil liberties). But see Labor Strife Laid to Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1937, at 21
(discussing views of Wisconsin Senator Robert M. La Follette in support of the Court-packing
plan).
158 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
9 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
160 For more on Roberts's switch and his denial that he had changed, see LEUCHTENBURG,
supra note 5, at 142-44, 177.
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professor Eugene V. Rostow, the Court "died, and was reborn, in
1937.,'6'
West Coast Hotel, decided March 29, arose from a challenge to a
state law setting minimum wages for women. The employer argued
Adkins had already established that such a statute violated freedom of
contract as protected by due process. 62 The West Coast Hotel dissent-
ers-the Four Horsemen-in an opinion written by Justice Suther-
land, agreed. 63 They concluded that this minimum wage law, appli-
cable only to women, constituted "arbitrary" class legislation. 164
"There is no longer any reason why [women] should be put in differ-
ent classes in respect of their legal right to make contracts; nor
should they be denied, in effect, the right to compete with men for
work paying lower wages which men may be willing to accept.' 65 The
five-Justice majority, with an opinion written by Chief Justice Hughes,
overruled Adkins and upheld the law. 6 6 Much of the opinion invoked
concepts familiar from earlier cases, concepts echoing republican
democratic government. The Court referred to the common good
with various iterations, explaining that liberty can be restrained to
promote "the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people"'67 and
that, more specifically, freedom of contract could be infringed "in the
public interest.' 68  Yet, near the end of the opinion, Hughes ap-
peared to accept the realist-inspired criticisms of the formalist distinc-
tion between public and private spheres:
The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position
with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively defenseless
against the denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to their health
and well being but casts a direct burden for their support upon the
community. What these workers lose in wages the taxpayers are called
upon to pay. The bare cost of living must be met. We may take judicial
notice of the unparalleled demands for relief which arose during the re-
cent period of depression and still continue to an alarming extent de-
spite the degree of economic recovery which has been achieved.... The
161 Eugene V. Rostow, Book Review, 56 YALE L.J. 1469, 1472 (1947).
162 W. Coast Hote4 300 U.S. at 380 (arguing that a State cannot override due process rights by
simply arguing the law is an exercise of the police power).
163 Id. at 411-12 (Sutherland,J., dissenting).
164 Id. at 412.
165 Id. at 411-12. Sutherland added:
Difference of sex affords no reasonable ground for making a restriction applicable to the
wage contracts of all working women from which like contracts of all working men are
left free. Certainly a suggestion that the bargaining ability of the average woman is not
equal to that of the average man would lack substance.
Id. at 413.
1 Id. at 400 (majority opinion).
167 Id. at 391.
168 Id. at 392.
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community is not bound to provide what is in effect a subsidy for uncon-
scionable employers.169
In this passage, Hughes reasoned that, without statutory regula-
tion, the operation of the economic marketplace did not maximize
employees' liberty. To the contrary, employers exploited workers by
coercing them to work for unreasonable wages. Moreover, if the gov-
ernment did not act to correct these inequities, it would, in effect, be
subsidizing employers because it would no longer allow indigents to
starve. If employers refused to pay a living wage, the government
would need to provide relief. By questioning the separateness of the
public and private spheres, Hughes implicitly doubted the republican
democratic conceptual distinction between a common good and par-
tial or private interests. The Court might still be using terms reso-
nant with earlier cases decided under republican democracy, but
such terms, such as "the public interest," now apparently meant
something different. Thus, the majority refused to invalidate the law
as class legislation, even though it extended protection only to
women and not to men. 170 Instead, the Justices emphasized that the
legislature can choose the manner and the degree to which it re-
sponds to social problems. 1
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., decided two weeks later,
erased remaining doubts about whether the Court had truly changed
its approach to judicial review. Again, in a five-to-four decision, with
the same majority and dissenters (and with Hughes again writing for
the majority), the Court upheld legislation that likely would have
been invalidated under the strictures of republican democratic judi-
cial review. Significantly, this legislation was not only federal, it was
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the statute that ushered in
an era of dramatically expanding union rolls and nurtured the trans-
formation of ethnic political outsiders into active voting citizens. The
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had found that Jones and
Laughlin had engaged in statutorily proscribed unfair labor prac-
tices. 17  Jones and Laughlin responded by arguing, among other
things, that Congress had exceeded its power by passing the NLRA.
7 3
In sustaining the law, the Court articulated two points crucial to the
transition to pluralist democracy. First, the Court refused to restrict
Congress's commerce power by reference to formal doctrinal catego-
ries. Jones and Laughlin argued that manufacturing was, by defini-
169 Id. at 399.
170 Id. at 400.
171 Id.
172 NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1937).
173 Id. at 13 ("The jurisdiction of Congress under the commerce clause... [does not in-
clude] the right to use such jurisdiction as a pretext for legislation which interferes with the
local sovereignty of the separate States.").
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tion, a form of production rather than a type of interstate commerce
and, therefore, beyond congressional control. In the past, such os-
tensibly non-commercial activities could be regulated only if they
could be categorized as an "essential part" of a "stream" or "flow" of
commerce. 75 In this case, though, the Justices repudiated such for-
mal categories as limits on Congress.7 6 Likewise, when Jones and
Laughlin argued that the regulated activities had only an indirect
rather than direct effect on interstate commerce-a categorization
that previously would have judicially doomed legislation-the Court
declared: "We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our
national life and to deal with the question of direct and indirect ef-
fects in an intellectual vacuum."'77 Instead of resolving the case in
such a vacuum, pursuant to formal categories like direct and indirect,
the Justices insisted that it must understand interstate commerce as a
"practical conception.' 78 And whether particular activities bore a suf-
ficiently "close and substantial relation to interstate commerce" to
justify legislative regulation was now, according to the Court, "primar-
ily for Congress to consider and decide.'
79
Second, the Court refused to classify employees or labor unions as
illegitimate factions who could not pursue their interests in the po-
litical process. In the past, the Court had consistently deemed any
statute that benefited unions to be impermissible class legislation fur-
thering a partial or private interest rather than the common good.
Labor relations therefore had largely been governed by the common
law, which had typically been interpreted favorably to employers. 8'
Meanwhile, courts had consistently concluded that statutes promot-
ing business or commerce promoted the common good. In other
words, pro-business legislation manifested a virtuous pursuit of the
public interest, while pro-labor legislation manifested a corrupt pur-
suit of partial interests. Now, the Justices abjured such a distinction
between employers and employees. "Employees have as clear a right
to organize and select their representatives for lawful purposes as the
[manufacturer-employer] has to organize its business and select its
174 Id. at 15.
175 Id. at 36.
176 Id. ("The congressional authority to protect interstate commerce from burdens and ob-
structions is not limited to transactions which can be deemed to be an essential part of a 'flow'
of interstate or foreign commerce.").
177 Id. at 41.
178 Id. at 41-42.
179 id. at 37.
180 See id. at 33.
181 See generally KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE LAW, AND LIBERAL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1991) (emphasizing that labor relations moved from be-
ing governed by the common law to being governed by legislation).
Oct. 2006]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
own officers and agents....2 Employees and employers stood on equal
footing: each group had its respective interests and values. True, a
manufacturer has a "right to conduct its business in an orderly man-
ner," but "[e]mployees [also] have their correlative right to organize
for the purpose of securing the redress of grievances and to promote
agreements with employers relating to rates of pay and conditions of
work.', 3 Indeed, the Court explained that even if the legislation were
"one-sided"-"subject[ing] the employer to supervision and restraint"
while "leav[ing] untouched the abuses for which employees may be
responsible"-the statute would still be constitutional.8 4 As a matter
of policy, Congress could choose which "evils" it would seek to rem-
edy and in what manner it would do so."'
After this case, the traditional structure of republican democratic
judicial review was defunct. If all legislation were a product of com-
peting interests, pressed by opposed groups, then the courts could no
longer invalidate a statute as class legislation promoting partial or
private interests. The Court might still explain that a particular stat-
ute furthered the general welfare, the public interest, or the common
good, but these terms had different connotations under the new plu-
ralist democratic regime. Insofar as there was a common good under
pluralist democracy, it was no more than an aggregation of private in-
terests and values; the common good no longer signified the virtuous
transcendence of self-interest. Congress, at its discretion, could le-
gitimately and openly act in response to the entreaties of the most
powerful or persuasive interest groups.116
The Court's commitment to a form of judicial review consistent
with pluralist democracy was nowhere clearer than in Wickard v. Fi-"7
burn, decided in 1942. Filburn challenged the constitutionality of
182 Jones &Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 33.
183 Id. at 43-44.
184 Id. at 46.
185 Id.
186 Later in 1937, after the Court had decided West Coast Hotel and Jones & Laughlin, the
Court upheld sections of the Social Security Act of 1935 providing for unemployment benefits
in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). In the past, the Justices likely would have
held that a provision benefiting the unemployed amounted to class legislation favoring only
partial or private interests. But now the Court reasoned that Congress must be allowed the
"discretion" to pursue the "general welfare" as it deemed fit. Id. at 583-89, 594. The Court also
soon decided another labor case that reinforced the right of workers to unionize and to press
their claims. Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U.S. 468, 482 (1937) (upholding state labor law);
see also Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938) (interpreting the pre-New Deal
Norris-LaGuardia Act to provide employees with a broad freedom to unionize). For additional
examples of the Court using language reminiscent of the republican democratic era, see Brown
v. Board of Education (Brown I1), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955), in which the Court invoked "the pub-
lic interest", and Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532 (1945), in which the Court allowed regula-
tion by states to protect "the public interest."
187 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which subjected his produc-
tion of wheat to regulation even if raised "wholly for consumption on
[his] farm.""' In upholding the congressional action, a unanimous
Court emphasized three points. First, it would not rely on formalist
categories to restrict congressional power. "[Q] uestions of the power
of Congress are not to be decided by reference to any formula which
would give controlling force to nomenclature such as 'production'
and 'indirect' and foreclose consideration of the actual effects of the
activity in question upon interstate commerce. ' 1 9 Second, the Court
would not invalidate legislation merely because Congress had appar-
ently favored one class or interest group over another; such class-
based legislation typified (pluralist) democratic processes:
It is of the essence of regulation that it lays a restraining hand on the self-
interest of the regulated and that advantages from the regulation com-
monly fall to others. The conflicts of economic interest between the
regulated and those who advantage by it are wisely left under our system
to resolution by the Congress under its more flexible and responsible leg-
islative process.
Third, and related to the prior point, the Justices stressed that poli-
tics, not the judiciary, constrained Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause. Congress, to be sure, did not possess unbounded
power, but the "effective restraints" on congressional power arose
"from political rather than from judicial processes.
" 9 1
In 1937, the Court's switch was conspicuous enough to be recog-
nized by contemporary observers; a New York Times banner headline
"hailed [the] bench change."9 2 Yet, the change was not precisely
revolutionary, nor for that matter, evolutionary. The switch was not
revolutionary-in the sense of being sudden and unanticipated-
because the constitutional system had been undergoing a gradual
transition from republican to pluralist democracy. This transition
started with demographic, economic, and cultural pressures that
traced back to before the 1920s. These pressures built over the years
until a transition in democracy became a fait accompli; a reversal of di-
rection became near-impossible. Hence, with hindsight, one might
reasonably conclude that, at some point, the Court's alteration of ju-
dicial review, acknowledging the new system of pluralist democracy,
became foreordained, a corollary to systemic changes already in
188 Id. at 118.
189 Id. at 120.
1q0 Id. at 129.
191 Id. at 120; see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (reasoning that the
Tenth Amendment was "a truism" and did not create judicially enforceable boundaries between
national and state power).
192 Supreme Court Upholds Wagner Labor Law; Hailed by Friends and Foes of Bench Change; Unions
See Sweeping Progress Within A Year, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1937, at 1.
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place. From this perspective, the Blaisdell and Nebbia decisions might
be characterized not as mere will-o'-the-wisps, but rather as early
manifestations of a gradual transition. Yet, the 1937 Court switch
should still not be depicted as merely an inevitable moment in a long
process of evolutionary change. True, the democratic structure for
the switch had been developing over the prior few years, but Roberts
might not have switched his posture. Not only had he previously re-
sisted doing so, but in 1936, in one of the cases invalidating New Deal
legislation, he articulated a quintessential statement of mechanistic
formalism:
When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not
conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of the gov-
ernment has only one duty,-to lay the article of the Constitution which
is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether
the latter squares with the former.
19 3
Moreover, FDR was not guaranteed the opportunity to replace the
Four Horsemen with new Justices more sympathetic to the New Deal
and pluralist democracy. Hence West Coast Hotel and Jones & Laughlin
did mark a distinct change in judicial direction. Pressures may have
been building for years, but the two weeks in 1937 marked the time
when the earth quaked and a new terrain emerged.
194
Regardless of how the 1937 switch is characterized, the question
arises: why did the Court and particularly Roberts change direction
at that point? No single clear answer is apparent, although several
factors seem pertinent* 95 First, political pressure undoubtedly played
a role. The Four Horsemen remained too intransigent to respond to
pressure, but Roberts and the liberal Justices were flexible enough to
care that many of the Court's decisions were being met with wide-
spread opprobrium. True, Roberts had already cast his vote in West
Coast Hotel before Roosevelt publicly announced his Court-packing
plan (though the Court's decision was not announced until after-
ward) .'.9" Even so, in response to the Court's series of anti-New Deal
decisions, administration insiders had been discussing for more than
two months several possible solutions, including a constitutional
amendment.' 97 While details had not been publicly divulged, admini-
193 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
194 See BRUCE AcKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONs 290-92 (1998) (mediating be-
tween the realist-revolutionary outlook and the legalist-evolutionary outlook). Compare
LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 5, at 231 (defending the characterization of the 1937 switch as revo-
lutionary), with CUSHMAN, supra note 5, at 104-05 (arguing that the switch was not revolution-
ary). For more on contemporary views of the Court's 1937 decisions, see LEUCHTENBURG, supra
note 5, at 142-43, and Friedman, supra note 5, at 1050-51.
195 See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 5, at 143 (discussing possible influences on Roberts).
196 Id. at 310-11 n.17.
197 Id. at 114-31.
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stration leaks had created a buzz in Washington by the end ofJanuary
1937: Roosevelt was preparing a major announcement about the
Court.'"s
Second, by this time, not only was the practice of pluralist democ-
racy well-established, but intellectuals had been questioning the theo-
retical underpinnings of republican democracy for more than a dec-
ade. In fact, the first threads of a pluralist democratic theory were
already being spun. While the Justices may not have read, let's say,
Charles Merriam's latest political science tome, they would not have
been oblivious to such intellectual rumblings. The Court was still ap-
plying principles of democracy that had for years been under intel-
lectual (as well as political) attack; the Court's concept of judicial re-
view was an anachronism.199
Finally, whatever factors prompted the Court's switch in early
1937, personnel changes on the Court would soon solidify its em-
brace of pluralist democracy. In May 1937, during the heated con-
gressional debates over the Court-packing plan, which eventually
would be defeated, Justice Van Devanter resigned.00 Roosevelt finally
had his first opportunity to name a new Justice. In August, after
more than two months of proscratinating, FDR nominated Senator
Hugo Black of Alabama, a die-hard New Dealer.20 ' This first opening
on the Court broke the dam, and Supreme Court vacancies came
rushing at Roosevelt. In 1938, he appointed Stanley F. Reed, his so-
licitor general, to replace Sutherland, another of the Four Horsemen.
The next year, FDR appointed both his confidant, Felix Frankfurter,
and then-chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission, William
0. Douglas, to the Court. In 1940, it was Attorney General Frank
Murphy's turn. In 1941, Stone was promoted to Chief Justice, and
Roosevelt appointed Robert H. Jackson, who had been Murphy's suc-
cessor as attorney general, and South Carolina Senator James F.
Byrnes, who filled the seat of the last of the Four Horsemen,
McReynolds. FDR made his final appointment in 1943, naming Wiley
B. Rutledge, whom Roosevelt had previously appointed to the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals. Hence, although FDR had been
198 Id. at 127-31.
199 See GILLMAN, supra note 5, at 147-93. Barry Cushman argues that the New Deal transfor-
mation culminated developments in which the premises of a "system of constitutional thought"
had weakened over the first forty years of the twentieth century until they no longer made
sense. In turn, "the structural relationships among its constituent premises, which gave the sys-
tem the appearance of symmetry and internal coherence," no longer fit together. CUSHMAN,
supra note 5, at 42. For early theoretical supports for pluralist democracy, see WALTER
LIPPMANN, THE GOOD SOCIETY (1937); CHARLES E. MERRIAM, THE NEW DEMOCRACY AND THE
NEW DESPOTISM (1939); and CHARLES E. MERRIAM, POLITICAL POWER (1934).
0 LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 5, at 180.
201 See id. at 180-85 for background on the Black appointment.
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locked in a constitutional confrontation with the Supreme Court
from 1935 to 1937, by the end of his presidency, he had created the
"Roosevelt Court," as political scientist C. Herman Pritchett would
call it in 1948.202
B. The Puzzle of Pluralist Democratic Judicial Review
Once the Court had accepted the structures of pluralist democ-
racy, judicial review itself became problematic. Under republican
democracy, courts had determined whether governmental actions
promoted either the common good or partial and private interests.
Through this judicial process, courts demarcated a conceptual
boundary between the public and private realms. But when the
Court stopped distinguishing between the common good and partial
or private interests-when the Court repudiated republican democ-
racy-then the purpose ofjudicial review blurred. The judicial func-
tion of limiting the government to acting within the public sphere
and thereby (supposedly) maximizing individual liberty within the
private sphere no longer seemed sensible. Moreover, if the structures
of pluralist democracy logically implied a new framework for exercis-
ing the power of judicial review, it was not readily apparent. How
were pluralist democratic courts to review the legitimacy-the consti-
tutionality-of governmental actions? From an intellectual stand-
point, the Justices were confronted with a typical modernist dilemma.
Under republican democracy, with its roots tracing back to a pre-
modern worldview, the foundation for objective judicial decision-
making was, in theory, indubitable: it was the categorical specifica-
tion of the common good and the consequent division between the
public and private realms. But now with the Court's movement into
the world of modernity, with the Court accepting pluralist democ-
racy, the firm republican foundation for decision-making had crum-
bled. The Justices, it seemed, needed to find a new foundation to
ground their decisions.
With the Court confronting the uncertainties of pluralist democ-
racy and the puzzle of judicial review, scholars and Justices began
worrying that judicial review itself was inconsistent with democratic
government-what Alexander Bickel would call the "counter-
202 C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT (1948). For information on the Supreme
Court Justices, see THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
(Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992).
203 See FELDMAN, supra note 37, at 91 (discussing modernist epistemological difficulties); G.
Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship, 88 VA. L. RENI. 485, 536-37
(2002) (discussing how epistemological developments in the early twentieth century threatened
the coherence ofjudicial decision-making).
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majoritarian difficulty. 21 4 Soon after Congress rejected FDR's court-
packing plan, then-Assistant Attorney General Robert Jackson gave a
speech acknowledging the significance of the Court's switch: it
"cleared the way toward improving the functioning of the United
States. 2 5 Yet, he brooded that potential "friction" between the Su-
preme Court, on the one hand, and Congress and the executive, on
the other hand, still "presents the most vexing problem. ''206 Indeed,
given that the Justices and other federal judges received lifetime ap-
pointments and thus were insulated from political-democratic pres-
sures-they could not be voted out of office-he insisted that
"[e] ither democracy must surrender to the judges or the judges must
yield to democracy. 0 7 As Thomas Reed Powell would explain, the
"primary requisite of a democratic society is a fairly wide popular par-
ticipation, 2 0  so the Court, "not democratically organized
and... least subject to democratic pressure," is inherently not "a de-
mocratic agency.
2
0
9
If Jackson presented the choice-the countermajoritarian di-
lemma, so to speak, where either elected legislative representatives or
unelectedjudges rule-then Judge Learned Hand became one of the
most articulate advocates for the legislative representatives-for de-
mocracy, as he saw it. In a 1942 speech published by the Massachu-
setts Bar Association, Hand described "enacted law" from a distinctly
pluralist democratic vantage: legislation is enacted in response "to
the pressure of the interests affected" and "ordinarily [manifests] a
compromise of conflicts., 210 The success of such a law "depends upon
how far mutual concessions result in an adjustment which brings in
its train the most satisfaction and leaves the least acrimony., 21 ' What
aboutjudicial review of such laws? Hand insisted that judges must re-
strain their own powers with a "self-denying ordinance."212 Courts
"should not have the last word in those basic conflicts of 'right and
M ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (2d ed. 1986); see also WIECEK,
supra note 5, at 241 (emphasizing the difficulties confronting the Court after the 1937 switch).
205 Jackson Calls Court Curb on Democracy; Says Law Reviews Block United Functioning, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 13, 1937, at 6 (quoting Robert H. Jackson, United States Assistant Attorney General, Foun-
ders Day Address at the University of North Carolina (Oct. 12, 1937), available at
http://www.roberthjackson.org/documents/ 101237/).
206 Id.
207 Id.
200 Powell, supra note 157, at 473.
209 Id. at 484; see also Friedman, supra note 5, at 1000-01 (citing Jackson's speech and examin-
ing contemporary attitudes toward judicial review).
210 Learned Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization (1942), reprinted in
LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 172, 173 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1952) [hereinafter Hand,
Contribution]. Hand would elaborate these views in LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
21 Hand, Contribution, supra note 210, at 173.
212 Id. at 175.
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wrong,"' even in cases involving Bill of Rights guarantees.1 3  Such
constitutional rights must "serve merely as counsels of moderation.
214
They are precatory, and their specific implementation and effect
must depend on the people and their elected representatives. Hand
realized that many critics would fume that civil liberties could not
survive without judicial protection. He responded: "[A] society so
riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no court can save;.., a
society where that spirit flourishes, no court need save; ... a society
which evades its responsibility by thrusting upon the courts the nur-
ture of that spirit, that spirit in the end will perish.21
Yet, other scholars were not as quick to abandon the Court's
power of judicial review on the shoals of pluralist democracy, even if
the Court acted in a counter-democratic fashion. And to be sure, not
all supporters of judicial review admitted that it contravened democ-
racy. Eugene Rostow, for one, argued that judicial review constituted
an important part of pluralist democracy, properly understood. "The
task of democracy is not to have the people vote directly on every is-
sue, but to assure their ultimate responsibility for the acts of their
representatives, elected or appointed."2 That is, Rostow maintained
that while federal judges might be politically insulated, they are not
politically isolated. The electorate bears "responsibility for the quality
of the judges and for the substance of their instructions, never a re-
sponsibility for judicial] decisions in particular cases. 2 7 Explicitly
criticizing Hand's position, Rostow attributed the desire to strait-
jacket the Court's power of judicial review to the lingering "dark
shadows thrown upon the judiciary by the Court-packing fight of
1937.218
Why did the countermajoritarian difficulty become so central to
judicial and scholarly thinking in the pluralist democratic regime?
To be sure, under republican democracy, the judicial categorization
of governmental actions as promoting either the common good or
partial or private interests sometimes provoked critics to charge that
judges exercised too much discretion. Moreover, judges could easily
be denounced for thwarting legislative desires, as was most evident
during the New Deal. Yet, the potential for countermajoritarianjudi-
cial decision-making rarely seemed as distinct or momentous in the
old (republican) democratic regime as it would in the new (pluralist)
215 Id. at 181.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205
(1952) (emphasis added).
217 Id. Thomas Reed Powell also emphasized the importance of political controls on the
Court. Powell, supra note 157, at 484.
218 Rostow, supra note 216, at 197.
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one. Unsurprisingly, the respective characteristics of the two types of
democracy structured the problems or difficulties that seemed to in-
here within judicial review. Unlike pluralist democracy, republican
democracy did not stress widespread participation and political pur-
suit of self-interest. The fact that judicial decisions might not accord
with the sentiments of the majority, thus, did not seem too problem-
atic. Indeed, under republican democracy, politics supposedly de-
manded the virtuous pursuit of the common good. Even a judge,
then, could be political without arousing indignation. If ajudge were
to decide in a partisan fashion, however-in pursuit of self-interest (or
a faction's interests)-then the judge's decision would be corrupt.29
Under the new pluralist democratic regime, however, politics
equaled partisanship; the pursuit of self-interest had become legiti-
mate and normal. Consequently, a judge who appeared to be politi-
cal was necessarily partisan, or so it seemed. Most important, then,
many observers had begun to view the Court through the prism of
pluralist democratic interest group struggles. The realist-inspired cri-
tiques of the rule of law, so predominant during the 1930s, had led
many to fear that adjudication was rudderless. Then after the 1937
switch, the Justices themselves added fuel to this fear. Starting in the
early 1940s, they began writing an increasing number of dissents and
concurrences. By the 1946-1947 term, the percentage of unani-
mous opinions had fallen to a then-record low of thirty-six percent.
22
1
While the explanation for this development remained obscure, one
possibility suggested by C. Herman Pritchett was that the Justices used
their opinions to assert their respective interests and values.222 And
even if the Justices were not crassly pursuing their own political pref-
erences, they seemed at best to be mere referees among contesting
interest groups. Indeed, led by Pritchett, post-war political scientists
largely accepted the realist critique of the rule of law and argued that
the Supreme Court was "a political institution performing a political
function. 2 22  If true, if the Court functioned to adjudicate among
219 G. Edward White argues that Barry Friedman mischaracterizes criticisms of judicial deci-
sion-making under republican democracy as countermajoritarian. White, supra note 203, at
527-28 & n.94 (criticizing Friedman, supra note 5, at 998-99 & n.109).
20 WILFRED E. BINKLEY & MALCOLM C. MOOS, A GRAMMAR OF AMERICAN POLITICS 525 (1949).
22 Id. at 525-26.
2 Pritchett attempted to explain the growing number of dissents by analyzing the political
positions of the Justices. C. Herman Pritchett, Dissent on the Supreme Court, 1943-44, 39 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 42 (1945); see also David M. O'Brien, Institutional Norms and Supreme Court Opinions: On
Reconsidering the Rise of Individual Opinions, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW
INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 91, 97, 102 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999)
(suggesting other reasons for the increasing number of dissents and concurrences).
PRITCHETT, supra note 202, at xiii; see BINKLEY & MOOS, supra note 220, at 525-26 (follow-
ing Pritchett in describing the Justices as displaying "a pattern of opposing ideologies"); White,
supra note 203, at 561-62 (discussing Pritchett). The historian Henry Steele Commager wrote
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competing interests and values-if the Court, in fact, made law that
would gratify certain societal groups and disappoint others-then in-
terest groups, it seemed, ought to begin pressing their claims to the
Court. Predictably, then, aided by changes in Supreme Court rules,
the number of amicus curiae briefs began to increase dramatically.
24
By 1953, more than ten percent of the cases had at least one amicus.
That year, Fowler V. Harper and Edwin D. Etherington wrote that
"[m] ore and more the Court was being treated as if it were a political-
legislative body, amenable and responsive to mass pressures from any
source." 25 And while Harper and Etherington fretted about this de-
velopment, the number of amici continued to row; by 1993, more
than ninety percent of the cases had at least one.
While scholars buzzed about the Court's countermajoritarian dif-
ficulty in a pluralist democratic system, the Justices themselves con-
fronted the puzzle ofjudicial review in the most practical of contexts:
deciding cases. In the shadow of the Lochner-era Court's aggressive
review of New Deal statutes, which had engendered the Court-
packing crisis, the Roosevelt Court Justices' solution to this conun-
drum was clear in at least one realm. They were to presume the con-
stitutionality of any economic or social welfare legislation. In fact, for
the next several decades, courts would, in effect, rubber stamp all
reasonable economic and social welfare regulations rather than ques-
tioning whether the action was for the common good. The quintes-
sence of the Court's 1937 switch, judicial deference to economic and
social welfare statutes, was integral to the New Deal expansion of gov-
ernmental power. Without the Court's extreme respect for such leg-
islative actions, the government's wide-reaching regulations of the
economy and society would have been constantly called into doubt
(as they had been during the Lochner era). In 1938, the Court ex-
plained:
[T] he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be pre-
sumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transac-
tions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the
facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to pre-
that constitutional issues were almost always determined by "'considerations of policy.'" HENRY
STEELE COMMAGER, MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS 43 (1943).
24 See Fowler V. Harper & Edwin D. Etherington, Lobbyists Before the Court, 101 U. PA. L. REV.
1172, 1173 n.5 (1953); Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72
YALE L.J. 694, 713-17 (1963).
225 Harper & Etherington, supra note 224, at 1173.
226 Lee Epstein &Jack Knight, Mapping Out the Strategic Terrain: The Informational Role of Amici
Curiae, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING, supra note 222, at 215, 221-22.
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clude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the
227knowledge and experience of the legislators.
But was the Court ever to review any governmental actions more
closely, or had judicial review transformed into one long series of
rubber stamps? If the Court was to defer to economic and social wel-
fare statutes, should the Court defer as well to all other legislative ac-
tions, which after all were now understood to be nothing more than
the product of interest group competitions and compromises? While
the Justices would disagree among themselves about the degree of
deference owed non-economic legislative actions, and while scholars,
like Hand, might recommend deference regardless of context, nei-
ther the Supreme Court Justices nor the lower federal court judges
were likely to abrogate their power over other governmental actors.
The power ofjudicial review, particularly at the Supreme Court level,
was too well entrenched in the structures and institutions of Ameri-S 2281
can government to fade to nothingness. Moreover, the sanctity of
individual rights and liberties had become part of the American
creed. In the realm of free expression, the deeply entrenched tradi-
tion of dissent had long manifested an American ethos of liberty.
Then, if anything, the desire to protect individual liberties in general
had intensified between the two World Wars. The ACLU, forged in
1920 in the crucible of the post-World War I Red Scare, had actively
sought to stiffen Americans' resolve to protect civil liberties through
an integrated campaign of education and litigation. Not incidentally,
an enhanced protection of individual liberty harmonized with the
rise of the mass-consumer culture during the 1920s. Mass-
consumerism intensified the American individualist ethos by portray-
ing the person as a bundle of desires. Civil rights and liberties then
became especially beneficial, it seemed, to protect the individual's le-
gitimate quest for self-fulfillment.
229
227 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). The Court's repudiation
of the non-delegation doctrine in the 1940s further facilitated the expansion of national power,
particularly executive and administrative authority. See Howard Gillman, Reconnecting the Modern
Supreme Court to the Historical Evolution of American Capitalism, in THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS 235, 244-45 (Howard Gillman &
Cornell W. Clayton eds., 1999). The Court's acquiescence in a more expansive national power
did not necessarily diminish state power. Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the
Unshackling of the States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 483-91 (1997). Leuchtenburg notes that the
Court allowed not only national but also state power to expand. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 5,
at 225-27. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 1 (1842), was merely one manifestation of this judicial respect for state power.
228 Cf James L. Gibson et al., On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SC. REV.
343 passim (1998) (describing the long-term public acceptance of Supreme Court decisions as
legtimate).
See ROBERT H. VIEBE, SELF-RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 223
(1995) (arguing that "rights were hooked to the urge for individual fulfillment"). Consistent
with this growing emphasis on individual liberties, the Supreme Court itself had allowed its
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Two congressional developments from the mid-1930s illustrate
how important the cause of civil liberties had become in national
politics. The first arose from the labor movement. After Congress
had passed the NLRA in July 1935, many employers fought compli-
ance and thwarted unionization through an assortment of strategies,
such as industrial espionage. Generally frustrated with such con-
certed efforts to oppose the law, and specifically outraged over the
treatment of Arkansas sharecroppers, Wisconsin Senator Robert M.
La Follette, Jr., spearheaded the formation of a subcommittee, the La
Follette Civil Liberties Committee, which conducted, over a four-year
period, "the most extensive investigation of civil liberties infractions
ever undertaken by a congressional committee.,130 Focusing on the
connection between civil liberties and labor organizing, the Commit-
tee reported startling and violent transgressions of freedom.23 ' Dur-
ing the 1930s, the "principal private purchasers" of tear gas were em-
ployers anticipating or resisting a strike.232  For instance, the
Committee found that, during one month, the Youngstown Sheet
and Tube Company had "bought, in addition to $8,500 worth of
[tear] gas equipment, 424 police clubs, six 12-gage repeating shot-
guns, 11,500 rounds of .38 caliber pistol ammunition and 300 shot-
gun shells. 2 33 The second congressional development was in reaction
against FDR's Court-packing plan. Much of the debate revolved
around whether the plan, if implemented, would enfeeble the judi-
cial protection of civil liberties. In fact, the adverse report from the
Committee of the Judiciary identified as primary reasons for rejecting
the proposal that it would undermine "the protection our constitu-
tional system gives to minorities" and that it would subvert "the rights
of individuals."2 34 To ensure that the Court remain a "defense of the
liberties of the people," it must not be pressured to decide cases "out
of fear or sense of obligation to the appointing power.,,235
Given such encomiums to civil liberties, the Court would not likely
relinquish its power of judicial review, especially in the contexts of
the World War II and Cold War eras, as the nation confronted the ex-
ternal menace of totalitarian governments. Fascists and Nazis au-
Lochner-era solicitude for economic rights to begin spreading to other individual rights. Eg.,
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
230 JEROLD S. AUERBACH, LABOR AND LIBERTY 1 (1966).
231 Industrial Munitions, reprinted in AMERICAN LABOR 254, 254-60 (Jerold S. Auerbach ed.,
1969).
232 Id. at 254.
233 Id. at 258.
234 Reform of the FederalJucidiary (Adverse Report from the Committee of the Judiciary, June 7,
1937), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 382, 387 (Henry Steele Commager ed.,
9th ed. 1973).
235 Id. at 382, 390; see also Friedman, supra note 5, at 1038-44 (describing concerns for the
Court's independence).
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thoritatively dictated to their populaces, arbitrarily imposed punish-
ments, and suppressed religious, racial, and other minorities. In op-
position, Americans stressed democracy, the rule of law, including
constitutional rights, and the protection of minorities-or so Ameri-
cans now wanted to believe. These ostensible components of Ameri-
can life and government separated us from them. Thus, in Martin v.
City of Struthers, decided during World War II, the Court struck down
the conviction of aJehovah's Witness under an ordinance proscribing
door-to-door distributions of written materials.55 In reasoning that
the application of this ordinance violated the First Amendment,
Black's majority opinion stressed that "[fireedom to distribute infor-
mation.., is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society
that... it must be fully preserved. 2 37 Murphy's concurrence, joined
by Douglas and Rutledge, accentuated the difference between
American and totalitarian governments. "Repression has no place in
this country. It is our proud achievement to have demonstrated that
unity and strength are best accomplished, not by enforced orthodoxy
of views, but by diversity of opinion through the fullest possible
measure of freedom of conscience and thought.
23 8
Finally, two more intertwined factors, both central to the emer-
gence of pluralist democracy itself, ensured that the Court would not
cede its power of judicial review. First, the expansion of governmen-
tal power, especially at the national level, prompted some Americans,
conservatives and liberals alike, to worry about potential tyranny. The
ACLU's 1933-34 annual report warned that the increased "power of
the federal government" could engender "inroads" against civil liber-
ties,239 while New York corporate lawyer Grenville Clark cautioned the
Chicago Bar Association in 1938 that "the existence of a vast central-
ized power is a danger to civil liberty. '2 40 Second, in many instances,
dominant elite conservatives were particularly motivated to encour-
age and support the judicial protection of civil liberties. Pluralist
democracy had emerged partly because of the actual expanding po-
litical power of outsider or peripheral groups, such as Irish Catholics,
Eastern European Jews, and laborers in general-a burgeoning
:36 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
237 Id. at 146-47.
2.M Id. at 150 (Murphy, J., concurring). Murphy added, "[i]n these days, free men have no
loftier responsibility than the preservation of that freedom. A nation dedicated to that ideal will
not suffer but will prosper in its observance." Id. at 152; see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) (contrasting the United States from its "present totalitarian
enemies").
239 Geoffrey D. Berman, Note, A New Deal for Free Speech: Free Speech and the Labor Movement in
the 1930s, 80 VA. L. REV. 291, 304 (1994) (quoting American Civil Liberties Union, Liberty Under
the New Deal: The Record for 1933-34, at 3 (1934), reprinted in 2 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
ANNUAL REPORTS (1970)).
240 Grenville Clark, The Prospects for Civil Liberty, 24 A.B.A.J. 833, 836 (1938).
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power that undergirded the New Deal. Not only had national gov-
ernmental power increased, but from the conservative perspective, it
was being wielded by a congeries of outsiders, the most tenuous of
Americans. This flowering of outsider political power, within the
framework of the pluralist democratic regime, threatened the status
and influence of old-stock Americans. Protestant elites, in effect,
were forced to retreat from their former hegemonic position, in
which their interests and values were often effectively translated into
the republican democratic common good. Yet, even as they necessar-
ily acquiesced to the emergent pluralist democracy, the dominant el-
ites refused to abandon their long-held prerogatives of power and
wealth. Rather, they sought to retrench. Forced to retreat, they
searched for positions where they could fortify and thus protect their
dominant (though no longer hegemonic) interests and values. One
such position of fortification was in the courts. 4'
Especially after the 1937 switch, dominant elites recognized that
the judicial enforcement of constitutional rights could provide a po-
tential bulwark against the majoritarian threat posed by the pluralist
democratic empowerment of peripheral groups. Frank Hogan, the
president-elect of the American Bar Association, urged lawyers in a
1938 address to remember that civil liberties protected not only the
"downtrodden" but also the "wealthy and privileged.2 42 That same
year, Clark specifically urged "conservatives," partly out of self-
interest, to act "as the intelligent, enlightened guardians of... civil
rights. '243 As if heeding the call, old-stock Americans sought the
"constitutionalization" of their own interests and values-the designa-
tion of their interests and values as constitutional rights enforceable
through the courts.244 When constitutionalized as judicially sanc-
tioned rights, their interests and values were effectively protected
from the vagaries of the democratic processes--democratic processes
that now included peripheral groups and that therefore dangerously
encompassed the interests and values of previously excluded outsid-245 ,
ers. Of course, dominant elites had long understood the potential
benefits of judicial power. Throughout the Lochner era, they had pro-
241 See AUERBACH, supra note 230, at 24-28 (discussing the ACLU's worries during the early
New Deal); David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1699 (1991) (arguing
that "the Court invigorated the Bill of Rights' non-economic guarantees of personal freedom"
in reaction to the New Deal government's "unprecedented interventionist powers," especially
"within relatively unaccountable administrative agencies").
242 RICHARD W. STEELE, FREE SPEECH IN THE GOOD WAR 11 (1999) (citing Hogan's address).
243 Grenville Clark, Address to the Nassau County Bar Association: Conservatism and Civil
Liberty (June 11, 1938), in 24 A.B.A.J. 640, 644 (1938).
244 See Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins ofJudicial Empowerment Through Constitutionalization, 25
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 91, 95-96 (2000).
245 See id. at 95-96, 99 (describing a similar process in other societies).
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tected their economic interests through the mechanisms of the
courts by seeking labor injunctions, the invalidation of labor laws as
contrary to the common good, and similar favorable judicial rulings.
But even when the dominant elites retreated in 1937-when eco-
nomic regulation became subject to mere rational basis review-they
still sought to protect their interests and values through the judicial
enforcement of non-economic rights, including free expression and
religious freedom. 46
This strategy contributed especially to the judicial invigoration of
First Amendment freedoms. For instance, in a 1941 labor case, the
Court reviewed whether an employer had engaged in proscribed un-
247fair labor practices under the NLRA. The employer, meanwhile,
pressed a First Amendment free-expression claim. Remanding for
additional proceedings, the Court decided that the NLRB had made
insufficient findings. The Court could not ascertain whether the
Board had concluded that either the employer's utterances alone or
the utterances combined with other employer actions had constituted
coercion, and hence an unfair labor practice 9. 24  The former possibil-
ity would be problematic. The First Amendment, the Court ex-
plained, protected the employer, who remained free to express "its
view on labor policies or problems., 25 G Put in different words, because
of First Amendment protections, "the utterances of an employer, in
themselves, may not constitutionally be considered to constitute an
unfair labor practice. 2 5' As this case suggests, the Court's post-1937
protection of civil liberties was not necessarily favorable to peripheral
groups. It was partly a conservative reaction against pluralist democ-
racy, with its inclusion of former outsiders and its expansive govern-
mental power.252 In a similar vein, the Court would subsequently hold
that the First Amendment protected corporations seeking to spend
money to influence voters and also limited congressional power to re-
strict expenditures on political campaigns.
2
53
246 See id. at 103; cf KERSCH, supra note 5, at 112-17 (arguing that judicial protection of civil
liberties was a conservative reaction to demands for expanded national power).
247 NLRB v. Va. Elec. & Power, 314 U.S. 469, 475 (1941).
248 Id. at 477.
249 Id. at 478.
25o Id. at 477.
251 Editors, Employers'Right of Free Speech, 2 BILL RTS. REV. 144, 144 (1941-42).
2 KERSCH, supra note 5, at 112-17. For a discussion of how the constitutionalization of
dominant interests and values influenced religious-freedom cases, see Stephen M. Feldman, The
Theory and Politics of First-Amendment Protections: Why Does the Supreme Court Favor Free Expression
Over Religious Freedom?, 8 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 431 (2006).
253 See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (pertaining to campaign
spending); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (relating to corporate
spending); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (relating to campaign spending).
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For numerous reasons, then, the Court would continue to exer-
cise its power of judicial review, most significantly in cases involving
civil liberties. But a doctrinal framework for resolving such cases re-
mained elusive, for the Justices as well as for others. As Jackson
would understatedly lament: "[T]he task of translating the majestic
generalities of the Bill of Rights, conceived as part of the pattern of
liberal government in the eighteenth century, into concrete restraints
on officials dealing with the problems of the twentieth century, is one
to disturb self-confidence. 2  Consequently, in a sense, the Justices
experimented, developing over the years three primary approaches
to pluralist democratic judicial review.
The first approach began to emerge almost immediately after the
Court's 1937 switch. In United States v. Carolene Products Co., decided
in 1938, the Court upheld an economic regulation that restricted the
interstate shipment of certain types of milk.2 "6 Stone's majority opin-
ion showed great deference to Congress, as typified pluralist democ-
ratic judicial review of economic and social welfare laws, but he
added a footnote explaining that such deference might sometimes be
inappropriate. His footnote four, initially drafted by one of his
clerks, suggested that a "presumption of constitutionality" would be
inappropriate if legislation either would likely cause or had resulted
257from defective democratic processes. Pluralist democracy, as the
Justices were just coming to understand, required an open and free-
wheeling legislative process. A legislative outcome was legitimate not
because it promoted the common good but because it arose from in-
terest-group competition and compromise. Thus, for instance, if leg-
islation would subsequently prevent some groups from voting or or-
ganizing politically, then Stone suggested it should "be subjected to
more exacting judicial scrutiny."258 If allowed to stand, the enactment
would impinge in the future "those political processes which can or-
dinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legisla-
tion."25" Likewise, if the pluralist democratic processes of competition
and compromise had been closed to certain groups or had been oth-
erwise defective, then the legitimacy of any legislative actions would
254 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
25 See WHITE, supra note 5, at 149-52 (describing the preferred freedoms approach used at
this time as an experiment). Ken Kersch notes that the judicial protection of civil liberties can
be understood as part of the state building project itself. That is, if the Court protects civil lib-
erties, then that judicial action is itself an assertion of governmental power (through the institu-
tion of the Court). See KERSCH, supra note 5, at 283-87 (emphasizing the role of the Court in
education as part of state-building).
26 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
257 Id. at 152-53 n.4.
258 Id.
259 Id.
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be doubtful. For this reason, if the government had intentionally dis-
criminated against a "discrete and insular" minority, like African
Americans, then judicial deference would be inappropriate. " In a
pluralist democratic regime, societal groups supposedly could press
their interests and values in a fair competition with other groups. But
when the government intentionally discriminated against a group-
against a discrete and insular minority-then "the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities"/ • 261
would be undermined.
Consistent with Stone's footnote, almost all post-1937 Justices
agreed that the Court should support pluralist democratic processes.
Even so, the Justices often disagreed about how to achieve that judi-
cial goal: how precisely could the Court best nurture pluralist de-
mocracy? One group of Justices, led by Frankfurter and Jackson,
placed extraordinary trust in the self-corrective powers of pluralist
democracy. From their perspective, the Court generally ought to al-
low pluralist democracy to rectify its own problems. The other group
of Justices, including Stone, Douglas, and Black, insisted that the
Court must be more vigilant in monitoring pluralist democracy.
Otherwise, it could too easily deteriorate into tyranny. The tension
between these two judicial camps animated the 1946 case of Colegrove
v. Green, in which a plurality held that the drawing of congressional
district lines in Illinois presented a nonjusticiable political question.
Writing for the plurality, Frankfurter emphasized that the point of
pluralist democracy, including congressional districting, was to assure
widespread participation in political processes.263 Yet, Frankfurter
added, pluralist democracy was inherently partisan, and the drawing
of district lines reflected "party contests and party interests. 2 64 The
Court, Frankfurter concluded, should avoid entering "this political
thicket., 265 If a state legislature drew unfair district lines, the proper
remedy lay not in the courts but in the partisan democratic process
itself: "to secure State legislatures that will apportion properly, or to
invoke the ample powers of Congress.,
266
Black, joined by Douglas and Murphy, dissented. Black agreed
with Frankfurter that a pluralist democratic system should promote
widespread participation. He disagreed, however, with Frank-
260 See id.
261 Id. For a discussion of footnote four, see FELDMAN, supra note 37, at 242 n.103, and Louis
Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reniniscence, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1093 (1982).
22 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
263 Id. at 553.
264 Id. at 554.
265 Id. at 556.
266 Id.
267 Id. at 570-71 (BlackJ., dissenting).
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furter's reasoning that the best way to promote participation was to
allow the further operation of legislative processes, particularly in the
midst of a districting dispute. Instead, Black underscored that the
current district lines in Illinois engendered grossly disparate repre-
sentation.268 Some districts had fewer than 200,000 people, while one
district had more than 900,000, yet each district, regardless of popu-S 269
lation, could elect one representative. Consequently, each vote was
not accorded "equal weight;" a vote in a high-population district was
worth less than a vote in a low-population district. 270 According to
Black, "[a] 11 groups, classes, and individuals shall to the extent that it
is practically feasible be given equal representation in the House of
Representatives, which, in conjunction with the Senate, writes the
laws affecting the life, liberty, and property of all the people. 27'
Thus, the Court could not trust the pluralist democratic process to
self-correct in this instance precisely because the challenged legisla-
tion prevented certain groups from fully participating, from having
adequate opportunity to influence future legislative actions.
Despite such disagreements among the Justices, John Hart Ely
would eventually develop Stone's footnote-four approach into a full-
fledged theory of judicial review: representation reinforcement.
273
Other approaches to pluralist democratic judicial review floundered
on the countermajoritarian difficulty, but Ely explained why repre-
sentation reinforcement (or Stone's footnote-four approach) was dif-
ferent-and why it would persistently appeal to the Court and schol-
ars. Properly understood, representation reinforcement theory
dissolved the countermajoritarian difficulty because it promoted and
bolstered rather than undermined democracy.7 The Court, Ely ar-
gued, should generally presume the constitutionality of legislative de-
cisions. Regardless of the outcome of the legislative process, the
Court should not disapprove legislation as contravening some sub-
stantive criterion, like the common good, because no such criterion
existed (or, at least, the Justices could not reliably identify such a cri-
terion). 7 *5 Legislative goals supposedly manifested no more than the
268 Id. at 566-67.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 569.
271 Id. at 570-71. This passage from Black accentuated a key difference between republican
and pluralist democratic judicial review. Under republican democracy, the Court questioned
whether legislation substantively favored a particular class (or a partial or private interest). Un-
der pluralist democracy, as explained by Black, the Court questioned whether a particular class
had insufficient opportunity to participate in the legislative process to influence the writing of
laws.
272 Id. at 572.
273 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
274 See id. at 88.
275 See id. at 72.
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interests and values of the democratic winners. As the Court ex-
plained in 1955, "[t]he day is gone when this Court ... strike [s]
down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, be-
cause they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a par-
ticular school of thought. 2 76 Yet, Ely reasoned, the Court could re-
view the processes that had led the legislature to take aim at one
27,substantive goal rather than another. If those processes were fair
and open, then the Court must defer to the legislative choice. 27 s But
if the processes appeared skewed, then the Court should scrutinize
the legislation more closely.2 9 Judicial invalidation of legislation that
had arisen from a defective or malfunctioning democratic process
would not be countermajoritarian. s It would be the very opposite: it
would foster fair and open pluralist democracy. The Court's role, in
211
short, was to police the democratic process.
A second approach to judicial review in the pluralist democratic
regime required the Justices to balance competing interests.
Throughout the 1930s, legal realists had criticized the a priori formal-
ism characteristic of Lochner-era judicial decisions. Judges could not
resolve cases by mechanically applying abstract doctrinal categories,
like the common good, to clear and certain facts. In any particular
dispute, they argued, opposed parties asserted competing interests
and values, which courts should balance or weigh against each other.
No higher criteria existed for resolving disputes.28  Starting in the
late 1930s, even as the realists' broadside critique of the rule of law
fell into disfavor, the Court followed this cue and resolved an increas-
ing number of constitutional issues by balancing interests. In the
balancing calculus, constitutional rights were treated as political in-
terests to be weighed against other interests, particularly governmen-
tal or state interests. For instance, in Schneider v. State, 2 decided in
1939, the Court invalidated a conviction under an ordinance prohib-
iting the distribution of hand-bills. Roberts's opinion, for an eight-
Justice majority, explained:
In every case... where legislative abridgment of the rights [of free
speech and press] is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the
276 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
277 SeeELY, supra note 273, at 1-104.
278 See id.
279 See id.
280 See id.
281 See id.; JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 2, 127-
28 (1980); Robert G. McCloskey, Foreword: The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REV. 54, 72-74
(1962) (analyzing procedure-based judicial review).
282 See generallyJEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Felix S. Cohen, Transcen-
dental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935) (discussing legal deci-
sions made without recourse to political, social, or ethical ideals).
283! 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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effect of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or be-
liefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regula-
tion directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such
as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democ-
ratic institutions. And so, as cases arise, the delicate and difficult task
falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the sub-
stantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the
free enjoyment of the rights."
In this case, then, the Court concluded that the individual's First
Amendment interest in distributing literature outweighed the gov-
ernment's interest in preventing littering.8
Such balancing tests soon became commonplace in numerous
contexts, not only in individual-rights cases but in others as well. For
example, in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. , the Court held that a state law
regulating the shipment of fresh fruit violated the negative implica-
tions of the Commerce Clause (or, in other words, the dormant Com-
merce Clause). "Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effec-
tuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the pu-
tative local benefits., 27 The Court elaborated the balance:
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of
degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it
could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.2ss
The Court's third approach to pluralist democratic judicial review
was also suggested by Stone in his Carolene Products footnote four. Be-
sides emphasizing the protection of democracy, he wrote: "[t]here
may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitu-
tionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
Amendments., 28 9 Stone cited two First Amendment cases that had in-
s4 Id. at 161.
2s5 Id.; see Aleinikoff, supra note 5, at 963-64 (describing the growth of the balancing analy-
sis).
286 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
287 Id. at 142 (citing Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)).
288 Id.; see, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 362 (1943) (allowing state regulation that bur-
dened interstate commerce if regulation was a reasonable accomodation of "the competing
demands of the state and national interests involved"); see Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant
Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 439 (1982) (explaining the negative implications of the
Commerce Clause). Ronald Dworkin has argued from a philosophical standpoint that rights
and interests are distinct concepts. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 194, 269
(1978); Aleinikoff, supra note 5, at 986-87 (discussing Dworkin's criticism). However valid that
argument might be philosophically, it does not undermine the historical argument concerning
constitutional rights and the use of balancing tests.
289 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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validated restrictions on free expression. 20 For a brief period after-
ward, the Court called these protected liberties "preferred free-
doms"-freedoms or rights that deserved special judicial protection.
For example, in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, decided in 1943, the Court
stated that "[f] reedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of relig-
ion are in a preferred position." While suggested by Stone in foot-
note four, the preferred-freedoms doctrine had historical roots wind-
ing back even earlier to the so-called incorporation doctrine. Early in
the twentieth century, the Court had begun to hold that the Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process Clause incorporated or implicitly
included various Bill of Rights guarantees, which then applied against
state and local governments just as they applied against the national
government.292 As recently as 1937, in Palko v. Connecticut, Cardozo
had reasoned that due process encompassed Bill of Rights protec-
tions integral to "the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty. 292
Such rights rested within "a 'principle of justice so rooted in the tra-
ditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamen-
tal.' 294 During the 1940s, some of these incorporated (fundamental)
rights were denominated preferred freedoms, distinguishing them
from economic liberties.29" The government could regulate eco-
nomic relations whenever reasonable, but it could not so readily re-
strict the preferred liberties.299 Hence, the Murdock Court invalidated
a regulation on the sale of religious literature by emphasizing that the
government sought to restrict a preferred freedom (religious free-
dom) rather than a commercial transaction (the sale of literature).
After the 1940s, however, the Justices rarely invoked the preferred-
freedoms doctrine.0 7
While the preferred-freedoms doctrine per se fell into desuetude,
the underlying principle did not. The point was to protect certain
290 Id. at 152-53 n.4. The two free-expression cases cited by Stone were Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359 (1931), and Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). According to Stone's clerk,
Louis Lusky, Stone added this part of the footnote in response to Chief Justice Hughes's re-
quest. ELY, supra note 273, at 76.
291 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
292 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 478-86 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing incorpo-
ration controversy).
293 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
294 Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
295 Howard Gillman, Preferred Freedoms: The Progressive Expansion of State Power and the Rise of
Modern Civil Liberties Jurisprudence, 47 POL. RES. Q. 623, 640-45 (1994) (discussing the rise of the
preferred freedoms approach); White, supra note 203, at 533-34, 539 (relating incorporation
and preferred freedoms).
26 See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945) (using preferred freedoms language);
Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting) (same).
297 See WHITE, supra note 5, at 149-52 (discussing the demise of the preferred freedoms ter-
minology). Frankfurter questioned the doctrine in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89-97 (1949)
(Frankfurter,J., concurring).
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liberties or interests from the pluralist democratic process itself, re-
gardless of whether the liberties were called preferred freedoms.
Thus, Justices and scholars would occasionally assert that the Consti-
tution carved certain areas out of the pluralist democratic process,
placing them beyond the majority's reach. During World War II,
Jackson wrote:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles
to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to
free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections.
298
And subsequently, Black and Douglas suggested that the absolute
protection of free expression was warranted. According to Black,
when the First Amendment declares that "Congress shall make no
law," it means that "Congress shall make no law. 29 9 This judicial ap-
proach rested on a key assumption: that certain liberties and inter-
ests are so important they should not be exposed to the vagaries of
the pluralist democratic process-which, after all, encourages indi-
viduals and groups to pursue their own interests to the disregard of
others. The pluralist admonition to pursue self-interest engenders
possibilities too dangerous to abide. To take an obvious example, a
democratic majority might decide to satisfy its interests by forcing a
particular minority into slavery. To be sure, one might argue that
such a slavery law would necessarily undermine pluralist democratic
processes by excluding the would-be slaves from political participa-
tion (thus triggering heightened judicial scrutiny under representa-
tion reinforcement). Yet, what if the courts were to disagree? What if
a defect in the process of enacting the slavery law could not be
proven in court? The crux of the third judicial approach-the pro-
tection from pluralist democracy-is that some liberties and interests• • 300
simply should not depend on such uncertainties.
29 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). Henry Steele Commager
wrote: "[T]here are things no government may do, rights no government may impair, powers
nogovernment may exercise." COMMAGER, supra note 223, at 5.
MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH 181 (1991) (quoting Black); see also G. Ed-
ward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 351-52 (1996) (marking the
doctrinal evolution through members of the Court).
300 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional
Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2376-77 (2002) (arguing that theories of
judicial review arose because "judicial deference to the political process seemed risky from the
perspective of the pluralist system as a whole"). Scholars on opposite sides of the political spec-
trum can support this approach to judicial review, though they will disagree strongly about
which liberties and interests should be protected. Archibald Cox explained that he would be
irked "if the Supreme Court were to void an ordinance adopted in the open Town Meeting in
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Even so, a majority of Justices rarely agreed that any right, free
speech or otherwise, should be absolutely protected, regardless of
context. Instead, they allowed the government to argue that in-
fringement of the right was, in the circumstances, appropriate. This
flexibility typically led back to a balancing test. The Justices weighed
the constitutional rights-interests against competing interests. The
Court, though, would often put its collective thumb on one side of
the scale: the Justices generally accorded individual rights, especially
those expressly enumerated in the constitutional text, like free
speech and equal protection, extra weight in the balance. The Court,
in a sense, created no-fly zones (where pluralist majorities could not
go), but simultaneously acknowledged that the zones could be in-
fringed for sufficiently important or compelling reasons. During
World War II, for instance, the Court upheld the national govern-
ment's internment ofJapanese-Americans in the face of an equal pro-
tection challenge. 3 ' The Court found that equal protection effec-
tively created a no-fly zone, but the Court allowed the government to
justify infringement pursuant to a balancing test, albeit one suppos-
edly skewed strongly toward the protection of individual rights.
30 2
"[A] 11 legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restric-
tions are unconstitutional," the Court explained. 30 3 "It is to say that
courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public
necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; ra-
cial antagonism never can. 3 04 Thus, the so-called strict scrutiny test, a
refined balancing test, originated in the Court's post-1937 struggle to
solve the riddle of pluralist democratic judicial review. The Court has
used strict scrutiny in a variety of circumstances, ranging from equal
protection to religious freedom.00 For years, the Court required the
government to grant exemptions from generally applicable laws that
the New England town in which I live-a meeting in which all citizens can participate."
ARCHIBALD Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 116 (1976).
Yet, Cox added that he would "have little such feeling about a statute enacted by the Massachu-
setts legislature in the normal political pattern, and none about a law made in that pattern by
the Congress of the United States." Id.; see CHARLES L. BLACKJR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT
87-119, 223 (1960) (arguing, from a liberal viewpoint, that the Court must check the more po-
litical governmental institutions). Robert Bork has agreed that certain rights are beyond the
reach of democratic majorities, but unlike Cox, Bork seeks to limit the number of such rights
severely. He would protect only those rights either "specified" in the constitutional text or in-
tent of the framers, or necessary to preserve our governmental processes. Robert H. Bork, Neu-
tral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 17 (1971).
301 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
202 Id. at 216.
303 Id.
204 Id.
s05 E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (applying strict scrutiny in an equal protec-
tion case).
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burdened the free exercise of religion unless the government could
show that the law was necessary to achieve a compelling state inter-
est.306 The Court, it should be added, did not use strict scrutiny in
every individual rights case. Sometimes, the Court would put its
thumb on the scale, but apply less pressure. Hence, the Justices
might apply heightened but less than strict scrutiny. In this manner,
the Court has upheld governmental regulations on commercial ex-
pression if the restrictions advance a "substantial" governmental in-
terest.
30 7
Two of the Court's approaches to judicial review-balancing of in-
terests, and removal from pluralist democracy (creating no-fly
zones)-exacerbated the hand-wringing over the countermajoritarian
difficulty. Critics condemned balancing as a subterfuge for judicial
decision-making without principles, without law. To instruct courts
to balance interests does not adequately specify what qualifies as an
interest (and thus becomes part of the balancing calculus), what
weight should be accorded to different interests, or even how differ-
ent kinds of interests can be weighed or compared. How, for in-
stance, would one weigh an interest in economic prosperity against
an interest in speaking freely? They are the proverbial apples and or-
anges (though it would be easier to balance apples and oranges).
Constitutional issues often "demand the appraisal and balancing of
human values which there are no scales to weigh," Learned Hand ob-
served. 30 "Who can say whether the contributions of one group may
not justify allowing it a preference? How far should the capable, the
shrewd or the strong be allowed to exploit their powers?"300 As Hand
elucidated, the problem "does not come from ignorance, but from
the absence of any standard, for values are incommensurable."
310
Even more important, given the omnipresent worries about the coun-
termajoritarian difficulty, if legislatures enacted laws in response to
competing interests, and the Court resolved disputes by balancing
countervailing interests, then what was the difference between legisla-
tive and judicial decision-making? Legislatures and courts, the critics
charged, should do more than provide different forums for compet-
Mo E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
307 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)
(commercial speech case). As Charles Black explained, the weighted or skewed balancing tests,
like strict scrutiny, obviated the need to identify specific rights as "preferred freedoms." BLACK,
supra note 300, at 220. The so-called preferred freedoms, like free speech, were those rights
that the Constitution specified as having greater weight. "An elephant weighs more than a rab-
bit," Black wrote, "not because he has a 'preferred position' on the scale, but because his mass is
greater." Id.
308 Hand, Contribution, supra note 210, at 178.
309 Id.
310 Id.
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ing interest groups to do battle. And if the Court lacked some better
justification for invalidating legislative actions, other than that the
Court's assessment of the parties' interests differed from the legisla-
ture's assessment, then the Court should defer to the people's elected
legislative representatives."'
To be sure, the Justices seemed concerned that balancing pro-
vided only a makeshift solution to the problem of pluralist democ-
ratic judicial review, but it was a solution that persisted, perhaps be-
cause of the lack of adequate alternatives. After the 1937 switch, it
seemed, the Justices realized the mechanism of judicial review
needed repair, but they were uncertain how to fix it. So they dug
down into the bottom of the toolbox, pulled out the electrical tape,
started wrapping it around, and tried to fix the problem as best as
possible. The sociological (Progressive) jurisprudents had recom-
mended that the Court assess social interests, but for the purpose of
more accurately discerning the republican democratic common
good. For what purpose now, under the new democratic regime, was
the Court to weigh competing interests-other than to repeat the
pluralist legislative process? Regardless, the tape-job held the judicial
mechanism together, though the Justices brooded over their flimsy
patchwork. At times, they seemed defensive, attempting to justify
balancing as truly principled. " [ S] triking the balance implies the ex-
ercise of judgment," Frankfurter wrote. r2 "It must be an overriding
judgment founded on something much deeper and more justifiable
than personal preference. As far as it lies within human limitations, it
must be an impersonal judgment. It must rest on fundamental pre-
suppositions rooted in history to which widespread acceptance may
fairly be attributed. 3 3
As problematic as balancing seemed, the judicial removal protec-
tion of certain liberties and interests from the reach of pluralist de-
mocratic majorities proved even more so. This approach to judicial
review had to confront the countermajoritarian whammy twice: first,
in the creation of the no-fly zones; and second, in the application of
balancing tests to determine, in any particular case, whether in-
fringement of a zone was appropriate. While some critics argued that
the Court should never recognize no-fly zones, a larger number in-
sisted the zones should cover only those rights expressly enumerated
in the constitutional text, such as free speech in the First Amend-
31 For one criticism of balancing in free speech cases, see THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM
OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 717-18 (1970). For a summary of the many criticisms of balancing,
see Aleinikoff, supra note 5, at 972-95.
312 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 267 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
313 Id.; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 5, at 962-63 (discussing the search for external values
upon which to rest judgments).
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ment. To these latter critics, like Robert Bork, the Justices were obli-
gated to uphold legislative actions unless clearly contravened by the
Constitution, which at least in theory also manifested the will of the
people. Bork and like-minded scholars thus became especially vitri-
olic when the Court began to invoke the right of privacy, an unenu-
merated right. 14
III. ROEANDJUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER PLURALIST DEMOCRACY
Just as Allgeyer and Lochner epitomized the methods and problems
ofjudicial review under republican democracy, Griswold v. Connecticut
and Roe v. Wade embodied the methods and problems of judicial re-
view under pluralist democracy. In Griswold, decided in 1965, the
Court invalidated a Connecticut statute proscribing the use of con-
traceptives, even by married couples.] Douglas wrote a majority
opinion joined by four other Justices. Two additional Justices, John
M. Harlan and Byron White, concurred in the judgment while writing
their own opinions. Given that Douglas's opinion relied on a consti-
tutionally protected right of privacy-a right nowhere expressly enu-
merated in the Constitution-all of the Justices worried that the deci-
sion would appear analogous to Lochner, which had relied on the
unenumerated liberty to contract.3
6
As Douglas prepared his opinion for the Griswold majority, he was
pressured to contemplate the potential link with Lochner. Douglas
initially circulated a draft opinion relying on the First Amendment
right of association, but Justice William J. Brennan responded with a
letter encouraging Douglas to beware the ghost of Lochner.31 Bren-
nan explained that while Douglas's draft did not invoke substantive
due process, his reasoning "may come back to haunt us just as Lochner
did."" Douglas rarely revised his opinions, yet this time he did so, at-
tempting to deflect the analogy to Lochner. In his final opinion,
Douglas insisted that the Lochner Court had exercised political discre-
tion, but the Griswold Court would not: "We do not sit as a super-
legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that
touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions. This
law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation of husband
314 E.g., HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 210, at 72 ("It is often hard to secure unanim-
ity about the borders of legislative power, but that is much easier than to decide how far a par-
ticular adjustment diverges from what the judges deem tolerable."); Bork, supra note 300.
315 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
316 See DAVIDJ. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF
ROE v. WADE 1-269 (1994) (discussing Griswold extensively); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT 337-39 (1993) (discussing Griswold).
317 SeeGARROW, supra note 316, at 246.
318 _
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and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of that relation.
31 9
Moreover, while Douglas retained his original discussion of the right
of association, he added an extensive discussion of privacy. He rea-
soned that the First Amendment as well as several other Bill of Rights
guarantees produce or emanate "penumbras" of privacy. 320 These
various penumbras, Douglas explained, combine to generate a "zone
of privacy"-a whole greater than the sum of its parts (the respective
penumbras) .32' He then concluded that the anti-contraception law
infringed the protected zone of privacy. Returning to his original fo-
cus on association, he emphasized that if the law were not invali-
dated, it would burden the marital relationship (or association) .
As was true of Douglas, the other Justices wrote their opinions in
the shadow of Lochner. Black's and Stewart's dissents accentuated the
countermajoritarian difficulty and the seeming similarity between the
Griswold and Lochner decisions. Wrote an exasperated Black:
My point is that there is no provision of the Constitution which either
expressly or impliedly vests power in this Court to sit as a supervisory
agency over acts of duly constituted legislative bodies and set aside their
laws because of the Court's belief that the legislative policies adopted are
unreasonable, unwise, arbitrary, capricious or irrational. The adoption
of such a loose, flexible, uncontrolled standard for holding laws uncon-
stitutional, if ever it is finally achieved, will amount to a great unconstitu-
319 381 U.S. at 482.
320 Id. at 484. Douglas wrote:
[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create
zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First
Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against
the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the consent of the
owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the
"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination
Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force
him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people."
Id. (citations omitted).
321 Id. at 485.
322 Douglas wrote:
The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created
by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it concerns a law which, in for-
bidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks
to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that relation-
ship.... Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms
for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of
privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.
Id. at 485-86.
323 See id. at 511-18 (Black, J., dissenting); id, at 527-31 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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tional shift of power to the courts which I believe and am constrained to
324
say will be bad for the courts and worse for the country.
Numerous constitutional scholars similarly attacked the Griswold deci-
sion. Bork and Raoul Berger declared that the Court had under-
mined the democratic process,325 while Paul Kauper and Alfred Kelly
insisted that the Court, like in Lochner, had illegitimately relied on
326
substantive due process.
Nonetheless, Griswold served as the springboard for Roe v. Wade,
decided in 1973. Roe invalidated the Texas anti-abortion laws, which
prohibited abortions except "for the purpose of saving the life of the
mother."3 27 After the initial oral argument, a five-to-two majority fa-
vored striking down the Texas statutes as unconstitutionally void for
vagueness (two new Justices, Lewis F. Powell and William H.
Rehnquist, had been confirmed by the Senate but had not yet joined
the Court). Justice Harry Blackmun circulated a draft opinion, which
did not reach the merits of the underlying substantive constitutional
claim, but the Justices then decided to have the case reargued the fol-
lowing term before a full Court.32s After reargument, the majority
now favored invalidating the anti-abortion laws on the merits. Black-
mun circulated a new draft opinion that would permit states to pro-
scribe abortions after the first trimester of a woman's pregnancy.
Justices Brennan and Thurgood Marshall suggested expanding the
protected right so that states would not be allowed to prohibit abor-
tions until viability, after the second trimester: Blackmun's finalS 331
opinion followed this recommendation.
Unlike Douglas's Griswold opinion, Blackmun's Roe opinion ex-
plicitly relied on substantive due process, thus openly risking com-
parisons to Lochner. Recognizing this danger, he immediately sought
to deflect it by insisting that the Court had decided Roe objectively,
"by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of predilec-S ,,332
tion. To support this claim to objectivity, Blackmun extensively re-
324 Id. at 520-21 (Black,J, dissenting).
325 RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BYJUDIcIARY 265 (1977) ("[I]n essence [Douglas] exempli-
fies the readiness of the Justices to act as a 'super-legislature' when their own emotions are en-
gaged."); Bork, supra note 300, at 5-6.
326 See generally Paul G. Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and
Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235 (1965); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the
Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119 (1965).
327 Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,117-18 (1973).
328 GARROW, supra note 316, at 521-22; see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 316, at 339-61 (discuss-
ing Roe).
329 GARROW, supra note 316, at 537-38.
"o Id. at 547-59.
331 Marshall's clerk, Mark Tushnet, initially drafted a letter to Blackmun recommending the
focus on viability. id. at 580-86.
332 Roe, 410 U.S. at 116.
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viewed the history of anti-abortion laws. He argued that the history
demonstrated abortion had traditionally been legal; anti-abortion
laws were an anomaly introduced mostly in the late-nineteenth cen-
tury.3  Blackmun then focused on the right of privacy. He admitted
that it was an unenumerated right, not express in the constitutional
text, but he reasoned that its existence had been clearly settled in ear-
lierjudicial precedents, particularly Griswold. Most important, Black-
mun wrote, the right of privacy included a woman's interest in choos-
ing whether to have an abortion:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state ac-
tion, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to en-
compass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
334
nancy.
Putting this in different words, Blackmun reasoned that the right
of privacy established a no-fly zone encompassing a right to choose.
State anti-abortion laws could infringe that zone only if necessary to
achieve a compelling governmental interest. Thus, the Court bal-
anced the competing interests, as it so often does in pluralist democ-
ratic judicial review. In weighing the various state interests against a
woman's interest in choosing, Blackmun developed the Roe trimester
framework. During the first trimester of a pregnancy, the state is
prohibited from restricting abortions in any manner. During the
second trimester, the state's interest in protecting the health of preg-
nant women justified state regulations of abortions but solely for the
purpose of protecting pregnant women. Finally, after viability and
during the third trimester, the state's "interest in protecting the po-
tentiality of human life" is so strong as to justify state prohibitions of
abortions, unless "necessary to preserve the life or health" of the
335pregnant woman.
With the exception of ChiefJustice Burger's brief concurrence, all
of the concurring and dissenting opinions revolved around the coun-
termajoritarian difficulty and the ghost of Lochner. Justices
Rehnquist's and White's dissents denounced Blackmun's claim to ob-
jectivity. Roe was, quite simply, Lochner all over again: the Court ille-
gitimately engaged in 'judicial legislation" to protect an unenumer-
336ated right under the guise of substantive due process. Naturally,
many constitutional scholars raised similar criticisms to the Roe deci-
sion. John Hart Ely, for instance, insisted that the Roe Court had ex-
333 Id. at 129-47.
334 Id. at 153.
335 Id. at 162-64.
336 Id. at 174 (RehnquistJ., dissenting).
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ceeded its institutional limitations by balancing interests in a legisla-
tive manner. Moreover, Ely added, Roe had followed "the philoso-
phy of Lochne," Roe and Lochner were "twins to be sure., 3 s Bork, too,
rode to the attack. The Court had once again undermined democ-
racy by assuming legislative prerogatives: "[N]ot one sentence [in
Roe] ... qualifies as legal argument," Bork fumed.3 9  Whatever one
think[s] of "the right to abort,.... [it] is not to be found in the Con-
stitution. 3 40  The Court had "legislated the rules [it] ... considered
appropriate for abortions by balancing the interests of the woman
and those of the state." 4 ' Roe, consequently, manifested "the assump-
tion of illegitimate judicial power and a usurpation of the democratic
authority of the American people. 342
In the face of such criticisms of Roe and Griswold, as no-fly-zone
cases based on unenumerated rights, numerous scholars stepped
forward to defend the Court's decisions. Many scholars rejected the
constrained originalist vision ofjudicial review proffered by Bork and
his ilk. They argued, first, that even expressly protected rights, such
as free speech, were ambiguous and required judicial interpretation,
and second, that the constitutional text itself did not suggest the
Court should be limited to recognizing only enumerated rights. The
Ninth Amendment-" [t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of cer-
tain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others re-
tained by the people" 343-suggested that the Framers themselves did
not believe in an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation.
Moreover, numerous scholars insisted that, regardless of the precise
language of the Constitution or the intentions of the Framers, the
Court's function in constitutional cases was to articulate our society's
fundamental values-to identify them as no-fly zones-whether based
on neutral principles, moral philosophy, tradition, societal consensus,
37 Ely, supra note 7, at 933-35.
3M Id. at 939-40. David Garrow calls Ely's article "[Miar and away the most important critique
of Roe." GARROW, supra note 316, at 609. Ely, it should be noted, claimed that his representa-
tion-reinforcement theory ofjudicial review "was intended to be as compatible with 'republican'
legislative and community behavior as with a 'pluralist' model." John Hart Ely, Another Such Vic-
tory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77
VA. L. REV. 833, 840 n.15 (1991). On the one hand, Ely is correct insofar as he is suggesting
that a republican democratic Court can be concerned with the functioning of democracy. See,
e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). On the other hand, Ely is surely
wrong if he is suggesting that the constitutional and democratic system of the late-twentieth
century was essentially the same as that of, let's say, the early-nineteenth century. Plus, he is
wrong insofar as he suggests that the Framers of the original document fully adopted a pluralist
system. ELY, supra note 273, at 80-82, 135.
M Bork, supra note 7, at 312.
340 Id.
"A Id. at 114.
3 Id. at 114-16.
34 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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or some other source of value and meaning (like natural law). For
some scholars, the right of privacy manifested a societal commitment
to individual autonomy and integrity: no woman should be forced to
carry a pregnancy through to birth if she did not wish to do so.
Other scholars argued that the abortion issue presented a prototypi-
cal question of equality. Regardless of Ely's arguments, anti-abortion
laws manifested purposeful discrimination against women because
the government forced only women, not men, to relinquish control
of their bodies for the good of another being.44
CONCLUSION: COMPARING LOCHNER WITH ROE?
Lochner was decided under republican democracy, while Roe was
decided under pluralist democracy. Having been decided under dif-
ferent democratic regimes, the two cases should not be analogized as
if they were of the same kind. To be sure, both cases can be criticized
and praised, but to do so sensibly, each must be criticized and praised
separately. Each case must be understood in accordance with the
proper background context, in accordance with the appropriate de-
mocratic regime. To criticize Lochner based on the tenets of pluralist
democracy is ahistorical and misleading. To criticize Roe as being
Lochner all over again, as if there were no difference between unenu-
merated rights cases decided under pluralist democracy and republi-
can democracy is likewise ahistorical and misleading.
True, the Roe Court Justices themselves worried about potential
similarities between Roe and Lochner (as was also true of the Griswold
344 For examples of scholars who argued that the Court must do more than police the de-
mocratic process, see BICKEL, supra note 204, at 23-28, which argued for decisions based on en-
during principles. See also RONALD DwORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW 1-12 (1996) (arguing for deci-
sions based on moral values); DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 288, at 131-49
(arguing for decisions based on principles derived from morality); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 91-93 (1982) (arguing that the role of the
judiciary is to decide "what rights... individuals should and shall have"); Laurence H. Tribe,
The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980) (arguing
that the Court must make substantive value choices). For express defenses of Roe, see Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L.
REV. 375 (1985); Thomas C. Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 83 (1980); Philip B. Heymann & Douglas E. Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v.
Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U. L. REV. 765 (1973); and Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Consti-
tution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984). See also Eskridge, supra note 300, at 2113-15 (construing
Roe as based on equality).
Other scholars criticized Ely's claim that representation-reinforcement theory was pure
process-based. To these scholars, the Court could not even in theory limit itself to doing no
more than policing the democratic process. The Court necessarily articulated or protected cer-
tain substantive values. E.g., Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1981);
Richard Davies Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223
(1981); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions ofJohn Hart Ely to Constitu-
tional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980).
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Court Justices). Yet, the Justices' attitudes do not diminish the im-
portance of the basic point: that the two cases were decided in fun-
damentally different democratic regimes. The Justices' concerns
about the potential case comparisons do not establish the validity of
the ostensible analogy. Rather, their concerns suggest the state of the
Roe-era legal culture vis-a-vis Lochner. The legal community had for-
gotten republican democracy; it had erased from memory the struc-
tures of republican democratic judicial review. Why? For one reason,
this effacement of republican democracy facilitated the condemna-
tion of Lochner-era cases as pure political decisions. In the story of the
Lochner-era that was being told circa 1973, when Roe was decided, the
Lochner Court Justices were arch-conservatives who corruptly twisted
judicial review so they could impose their political values on a people
overwhelmingly favoring the liberal New Deal. This story justified
post-193 7 Supreme Court decision-making as harmonious with the
traditional structures of judicial review, which the Lochner-era Justices
had supposedly disregarded.4 '
This story also facilitated the promotion of the nation's interests
during the Cold War. Coming on the heels of the country's World
War II confrontation with the Nazis, the Cold War locked the United
States in a struggle with the Soviet Union for the allegiance of emerg-
ing Third World nations. Given the now-condemned racist practices
of the Nazis, and given the need to appeal to people of color in Third
World countries, the nation sought to claim that American democ-
racy stood for liberty and equality for all, regardless of race, color,
creed, or gender. To make such a claim, Americans needed to forget
how the nation had systematically excluded blacks, women, and other
religious and racial outsiders from participating in politics for most of
the nation's history. 46 In other words, the nation needed to forget its
republican democratic past, when the principles of civic virtue and
the common good justified political exclusion and subjugation.
Thus, in the 1950s, we find books like The Liberal Tradition in America,
where Louis Hartz argues that the United States was born liberal. Its
lack of a feudal past, according to Hartz, ensured its initial commit-
ment to freedom, equality, and property. As Hartz phrased it, "Burke
equaled Locke in America.
Roe's critics, it should be added, found this effacement of the re-
publican democratic past advantageous (though I do not mean to
345 See GILLMAN, supra note 5, at 3-4 (describing the political interpretation of the Lochner
era); HORWITZ, supra note 5, at 7 (describing standard Progressive history of the Lochner Court
and its demise).
346 For discussions about.Cold War imperatives and the Civil Rights Movement, see MARY L.
DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS (2000), and Derrick A. Bell,Jr., Brown v. Board of Education
and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
M7 LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 156 (1955).
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suggest that this collective amnesia was some type of conscious con-
spiracy). It was far easier to condemn Roe as being Lochner all over
again if one disregarded (or was unaware of) the significant differ-
ences between the pluralist and republican democratic regimes.
Each regime had its own unique tenets or principles, and because of
those differences, each also had distinctive structures for (and prob-
lems of) judicial review. In short, Lochner and Roe are incommensur-
able, decided within different paradigms of democracy. Lochner
should be evaluated within the parameters of republican democracy,
while Roe should be evaluated within the parameters of pluralist de-
mocracy. Thus, one might ask whether the Lochner Court correctly
distinguished the common good from partial or private interests
within the context of that case. And one might ask whether the Roe
Court correctly identified the right of privacy as a no-fly zone as well
as correctly weighing the state's interests against a woman's interest in
choice. But one should not reverse these questions, asking for in-
stance whether the Roe Court correctly identified the common good.
This question would be no more coherent within the pluralist de-
mocratic regime than asking whether the Court properly balanced
competing interests within the republican democratic regime.
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